Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions by McMorrow, Judith A. et al.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2004
Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney
Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions
Judith A. McMorrow
Boston College Law School, judith.mcmorrow@bc.edu
Jackie Gardina
Vermont Law School
Salvatore Ricciardone
Boston College Lynch School of Education
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Legal History, Theory and Process Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie Gardina, and Salvatore Ricciardone. "Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A
View From the Reported Decisions." Hofstra Law Review 32, (2004): 1425-1474.
HeinOnline -- 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1425 2003-2004
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD 
CONFRONTING ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT: 
A VIEW FROM THE REPORTED DECISIONS 
Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 20 years, a rich body of literature has emerged to 
describe the increasingly complex system of lawyer regulation in the 
United States. I Lawyers are regulated through norms of conduct 
established and enforced by the bar, judges in litigation, and 
administrative agencies; through substantive laws that apply to lawyers, 
malpractice standards, best practices imposed by insurance companies, 
and more. While the judge's role has been explored through the lens of 
particular subject areas (such as conflicts of interest) or through an 
analysis of the court's power to sanction, we still have much to learn 
about judicial attitudes and approaches toward the judge's own role in 
regulating attorney conduct.2 The goal of this article is to study the 
* Judith A. McMorrow is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. Jackie A. 
Gardina is a Visiting Professor at Vermont Law School. Salvatore Ricciardone, J.D., is a Ph.D. 
candidate at Boston College Lynch School of Education. The authors appreciate the excellent 
research assistance of Dominic Gomez and Jerry Kazanjian. Prof. McMorrow expresses her thanks 
for the generous research support provided by Boston College Law School Fund in support of this 
article. 
\. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, An institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who 
Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167 
(2003); Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 33 
(1996); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1992). 
2. See Randall T. Shepard, What Judges Can Do About Legal Professionalism, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 621 (1997). "Judges write rules of procedure and professional responsibility, and 
lawyers and non-lawyers alike look to judges for models of integrity, civility and professionalism. 
Still, the profession, the bench, and the academy have largely failed to articulate a clear judicial 
role." id. at 622. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of interest in Litigation: The Judicial 
Role, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 71 (1996); John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of 
Ethics-Fear and Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95 (1982); Fred C. 
1425 
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available data from the Code of Judicial Conduct and federal and state 
court opinions to glean a richer understanding of how judges construct 
their individual and institutional role in this web of attorney regulation. 
We begin with a premise that judges are very important actors in 
legal ethics. State Supreme Court justices are empowered to regulate the 
profession and serve as the gatekeepers in issuing licenses to practice 
law.3 State Supreme Court justices take this structural role very seriously 
and see themselves as important not just in running the disciplinary 
apparatus, but also in establishing aspirational norms of 
professionalism.4 This article explores the more specific role of 
individual trial and appellate court judges in addressing and establishing 
norms of conduct for lawyers in litigation.5 
It is important to understand how judges construct their role in 
regulating attorney conduct because judges are the primary regulators of 
litigation conduct. While much of the litigation action occurs outside the 
courtroom, judges set the norms for that out-of-court litigation conduct 
through the signals that they send and the sanctions they impose for 
conduct that occurs during pretrial conferences, discovery motions, and 
other pre- and post-trial activity.6 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of 
a Theory, 56 V AND. L. REv. 1303 (2003). 
3. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.1 (1986). Most state supreme 
courts fulfill this role by delegating the specific authority to state bar associations (in states with an 
integrated bar) or through a separate agency. See generally Barton, supra note I, at 1249. 
4. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER 
CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999) available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplanl 
NatlActionPlan.html. See also E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key 
Issues of Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REv. 1,4 (2002). 
!d. 
Our objective [in Ethics 2000 revision of Model Rules of Professional Conduct) was also 
to resist the temptation to preach aspirationally about "best practices" or professionalism 
concepts. Valuable as the profession might find such guidance, sermonizing about best 
practices would not have-and should not be misperceived as having-a regulatory 
dimension. There are other vehicles for accomplishing that noble objective [such as the 
Conference of Chief Justices' National Action Plan on Professionalism). 
5. One would anticipate that this structural role in regulating the legal profession would 
potentially influence a state supreme court justice's vision of the judge's role in regulating attorney 
conduct during litigation. As discussed in detail in Part IV infra, we could not discern a significantly 
different attitude toward regulating attorney conduct in state court opinions. Those differences may 
exist, but they were not strongly evident in the written opinions. 
6. While it appears that actual trials are on the decline, lawsuits continue to be filed in a 
robust fashion in the United States. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 142-43 (2002) (describing decline of the civil trial); 
Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice and the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 127, 128-29 
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Judges have a panoply of procedural and substantive rules to 
address attorney conduct issues that arise in litigation. For example, in 
federal courts judges may rely on Rule 11 and Rule 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as various discovery rules, to establish 
norms of conduct and impose sanctions.7 Judges can supplement these 
rules with their own creative responses using the court's inherent power, 
a subject addressed in greater detail below.8 State judges have a similar 
variety of rules and inherent powers.9 These rules and the inherent power 
doctrine give judges the power to regulate attorney conduct, but we do 
not fully understand what motivates a judge to use these powers. 10 What 
visions do judges hold of the court's role in the mosaic of regulating 
attorney conduct? Judicial motivation is typically studied to understand 
why a judge decides cases in a certain way.ll Penetrating judicial 
motivation when regulating attorney conduct can be particularly 
challenging. We can envision several possible motivations. Judges are 
likely to be very concerned about the limits of their power or other 
aspects of their institutional role. Efficiency concerns are likely to be a 
(2002). Courts have the ability to sanction out-of-court conduct. See infra Part 111 and Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., SOl U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (upholding federal court authority to sanction conduct, 
including conduct that occurred outside the courtroom). 
7. For an excellent development of the rule-based sanctions, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, THE 
FEDERAL LAW OF liTIGATION ABUSE (3d ed. 2000). 
8. See JUDITH A. McMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF 
ArrORNEY CONDUCT, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 807 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter McMORROW 
& COQUILLETTE); Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 1342-51. 
9. See infra Part IV.A. 
10. See Shepard, supra note 2, at 621 ("Judges strive to do justice, but we reveal little about 
how we function."). See generally Mareen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and 
the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 S.M.U. L. REv. 493 (1997). 
II. Most empirical work on judicial behavior has focused on the United States Supreme 
Court. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial 
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 621 (2000). More recent studies have examined the behavior of 
trial court judges, typically federal court judges. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, 
& Stewart 1. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258-60 (1995) (studying dockets in three federal trial courts that 
randomly assign judges, authors found little evidence that the characteristics of the judges or 
political party of the appointing president was a significant predictor of judicial decisions); Sue 
Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (\993) (describing empirical research on the behavior of women 
decision-makers). See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting 
the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1377 (1998) (studying federal lower court decisions which analyzed the constitutionality of federal 
criminal sentencing guidelines). 
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dominant factor. 12 In states with an elected judiciary, election pressures 
are perceived to influence a judge's actions on the bench. 13 Judges may 
be concerned about collegiality among the judges on their court and/or 
for one's reputation as a fair-minded judge. 14 Judges may also be 
cognizant and protective of the reputation of the attorney whose conduct 
is being questioned. IS These concerns may be very hard to ascertain 
from written opinions, particularly since the very concerns of efficiency, 
collegiality and reputation may encourage a judge to be silent or do 
nothing. We would predict that the process of writing itself would reveal 
slower and more reflective thought processes, rather than the immediate, 
often reactive, response of a judge in the course of litigation. 16 
Consequently, we would anticipate that the written record leaves a trail 
from which we can discern a partial, and potentially distorted, picture of 
judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct in litigation. 
While there is obviously no single vision of the judicial role in legal 
ethics, what we have discovered are glimpses of attitudes. One needs to 
examine the cases for what the courts say, what conduct they choose to 
12. See generally Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC'y REv. 3 
(1997). See also Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 1360 ("efficient allocation of judicial resources 
militates in favor of district courts confining themselves to adjudicating questions of professional 
misconduct that can be resolved without resort to an independent fact-finding mechanism."). 
13. See generally Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 
S.C. L. REv. 667 (2001). 
14. See generally In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d 178, 187 (Mo. 1987) (discussing that without 
Canon 38(3) judges may be tempted to avoid "rocking the boat," but not "every failure to inform 
about well-publicized rriisbehavior of a fellow judge" is misconduct); Leslie W. Abramson, The 
Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct By Other Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial 
Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 751, 780 (1997) ("Understandably, what judge would want the 
reputation of a snitch?"); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (summarizing theories of influences on judicial decision 
making); Schauer, supra note II, at 620-21. Reputation is a multifaceted subject, a full exploration 
of which is well beyond the scope of this article. Reputation concerns may include a desire to avoid 
controversy if the judge is subject to reelection, a desire for influence in the legal academy, a desire 
for influence in the local or state bar, and the like. Reputation may have the more genial goal of 
serving as confirmation that the judge is actually a fair-minded and fair-acting arbiter. 
15. Judges may agree with Justice Stevens' factual assessment that "[d]espite the changes that 
have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still believe that most 
lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is their professional reputation." 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,413 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part). 
16. Cj David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (2001) ("An ethical judge must demand of herself that she identify and 
understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case. Writing opinions has an 
important role in this effort."); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 
(2003). 
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sanction, and the nature of the sanction imposed. We have found a 
handful of reported decisions touching on the Code of Judicial Conduct 
and a larger body of federal and state court cases discussing, often 
indirectly, the judge's role in regulating attorney conduct. The picture 
that emerges from the reported decisions in both state and federal courts 
is a desire to maintain the integrity of the judicial process and a concern 
for the efficiency and fairness in the proceeding before the court. 
Concern for the integrity of the legal profession as an independent 
concern appears to playa lesser role in judges' attitudes, at least as 
reflected in the reported decisions. There is an obvious connection 
between the legal profession and the judicial system, but regulating 
attorney conduct is derivative or secondary to the larger goals of a fair 
and efficient legal proceeding. This picture of judicial attitudes toward 
confronting attorney misconduct appears to reflect a seasoned and 
thoughtful assessment of the institutional capabilities of judges. 
As often happens with in depth research, the more we learn, the less 
we know. This research suggests that the reported decisions cannot 
answer some of the most compelling questions about judicial attitudes 
toward legal ethics. The reported decisions do not provide a systematic 
and reliable picture, beyond anecdotes, of the ethical issues that arise in 
the courtroom. They do not provide a well-developed description of the 
informal mechanisms used by judges to address ethical issues in their 
courtrooms or reveal why judges exercise their significant drafting 
power to sometimes comment on attorney conduct in written opinions 
and other times choose to deal with the conduct issues informally. These 
issues await a more in depth empirical study. 17 
II. THE JUDGE'S ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS 
ATTORNEY CONDUCT ISSUES IN THE COURTROOM-
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
A. Overview of Judicial Ethics Obligation 
It is well acknowledged that judges "are held to higher standards of 
integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested 
17. In the interests of full disclosure, Judith McMorrow is in the midst of an "access study," 
interviewing ten to fifteen judges to identify judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct. 
The authors hope to undertake a much more rigorous study to explore the issues identified in this 
article. 
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with the public trust." 18 It is less clear, however, whether that heightened 
standard includes a heightened obligation to address attorney ethics 
issues. One can envision a judge's role ranging from a benign observer 
to an active participant in attorney regulation. 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which serves as the template 
for disciplinary norms for state judges and for the applicable code of 
conduct for federal judges, begins with the overarching obligation to 
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.19 This duty 
drives from the judiciary's central role in our legal system.20 Canon 3 
makes clear that the judge's judicial duties "take precedence over all the 
judge's other activities.,,21 The 1972 version of the Code divided the 
judge's core functions into adjudicative and administrative functions, the 
latter of which included a provision that judges should address judicial 
and attorney misconduct. 22 Canon 3 of the 1990 version of the Code 
sharpened the focus of the judge's ethical responsibilities by dividing the 
judge's judicial duties into three core functions: adjudicative 
responsibilities (3B), administrative responsibilities (3C) and 
disciplinary responsibilities (3D).23 
18. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBEr & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND 
ETHICS § 1.01 (3d ed. 2000) (citing In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159, 164 (Or. 1975» [hereinafter 
SHAMAN]' See Hayes v. Alabama Court of the JUdiciary, 437 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Ala. 1983); In re 
La Motte, 341 So. 2d 513,517 (Fla. 1977); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203, 235 (Mass. 1973); Leslie 
W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 949, 960 n.35 (1996); 
David Cleveland & Jason Masimore, The Ermine and Woolsack: Disciplinary Proceedings 
Involving Judges, Attorney-Magistrates, and Other Judicial Figures, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1037,1044-45 (2001). 
19. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/voI2/chl.html. See 
generally Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality 
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000). Federal judges are 
subject to sanction for engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 
administration of the business ofthe courts." 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2004). This statute is not intended 
to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct, which functions as aspirational as to federal judges. In re 
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) ("This is not to say the Canons 
are not important. They are. As a judiciary, we should do all we can to educate and motivate judges 
to achieve the aspirational goals of the Canons. But the judicial misconduct procedures were not 
meant to be nor are they designed to enforce those goals."); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 91 
F.3d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir. 1996). 
20. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (1990) ("Our legal system is based on the 
principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that 
govern us.") 
21. Id. at Canon 3A. 
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972). 
23. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990). The Canon 3 admonition that 
"A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently," provides five 
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While both the 1972 and 1990 versions of the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct envision disciplinary responsibilities as one aspect of 
the judge's role, the content of those responsibilities has not been 
thoroughly delineated. Canon 3B(3) of the 1972 ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct identified the judge's disciplinary responsibilities to 
"take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or 
lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become 
aware.,,24 Some states edited the language to expand on the obligation, 
but the language obviously leaves ample room for interpretation. The 
1972 version did not distinguish between degrees of misconduct and did 
not expressly address what constitutes "appropriate disciplinary 
measures" and when disciplinary action would be appropriate?5 
The 1990 Code offered somewhat better guidance by 
acknowledging the obligation to address misconduct of judges and 
lawyers. As to lawyers, Canon 3D(2) ofthe 1990 Code provides that: 
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood 
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge 
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the 
. th· 26 appropnate au onty. 
The commentary offered one slender paragraph of additional 
insight. "Appropriate action may include direct communication with the 
judge or lawyer who has committed the violation, other direct action if 
available, and reporting the violation to the appropriate authority or 
other agency or body." 27 This commentary makes clear that reporting to 
the bar is not the exclusive sanction for misconduct.28 Section 3D(3) 
categories of responsibility of a judge: judicial duties in general, adjudicative responsibilities, 
administrative responsibilities, disciplinary responsibilities and disqualification. Id. See also 
Cleveland & Masimore, supra note 18, at 1039-40; 8rian Holland, The Code of Judicial Conduct 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparison of Ethical Codes for Judges and 
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725, 732-33 (1989). 
24. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 38(3) (1972). 
25. Alex Rothrock, Ex Parte Communications with a Tribunal: From Both Sides, 29 COLO. 
LAW. 55, 60 (2000). 
26. The term "knowledge" "denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's 
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." The term "appropriate authority" "denotes the 
authority with responsibility for initiation of disciplinary process with respect to the violation to be 
reported." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990). 
27. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(2) cmt. (1990). 
28. See Abramson, supra note 14,761-62. 
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reinforces the idea that disciplinary actions, including appropriate 
response and reporting, are part of the judicial duties and provides that 
disciplinary activities are absolutely privileged.29 
B. Informal Approaches: Appropriate Action 
Section 3D divides the judge's obligation into formal and informal 
approaches. Information about a violation of the applicable rules of 
conduct triggers only the suggestive language that the judge "should take 
appropriate action." This language essentially punts to judicial 
discretion. The option to act ("should") and the flexible response 
("appropriate action") are so open-ended as to offer no meaningful 
guidance to judges as to the judge's ethical obligation. State courts 
occasionally cite 3D as support for a duty to address attorney 
misconduct. 3D Federal courts also occasionally look to the comparable 
provision of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges to justify 
their decisions concerning alleged attorney misconduct. 31 While the 
commentary to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges suggests 
direct communication and other direct action, these same actions are 
typically authorized by the rules of court and the judge's flexible 
inherent powers. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges may 
29. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 30(3) (1990) ("Acts of a judge, in 
the discharge of disciplinary responsibilities, required or permitted by Sections 30(1) and 30(2) are 
part of a judge's judicial duties and shall be absolutely privileged, and no civil action predicated 
thereon may be instituted against the judge. "). 
30. Cf Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d 356, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
("inherent authority encompasses not only the power but also the duty to discipline attorneys, who 
are officers of the court, for unprofessional conduct") (citing In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 233 
(N.c. 1977)). 
31. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14,23-24 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that "because 
not every violation of the ethics rules deserves punishment, there remains the question as to whether 
this matter warrants a referral to the Disciplinary Panel for further proceedings" but referral to the 
Oistrict Court's Committee on Grievances is appropriate in this case because counsel was aware 
that contact with class members was questionable but did not seek advance approval by stating, 
"[iJn the face of such misconduct, it would be an act of negligence for this Court to stand idly by."). 
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States in 1973 and has been updated periodically. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, III (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Code of Conduct for United States Judges still uses the older 
38(3) formulation that "[aJ judge should initiate appropriate action when the judge becomes aware 
of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional conduct by a judge or lawyer." 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/ 
vol2/chl.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). 
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also provide independent justification to explore ethical violations of 
court officers.32 
The very openness of this Canon 3D(2) language suggests that a 
response to professional violations might constitute "best practices" for a 
judge and be wise use of the judge's discretion.33 It is not evident, 
however, that it rises to the level of an ethical obligation. The openness 
and looseness of the language is likely one reason why some states 
elected to drop this language from their state versions of the Model Code 
and instead included only the second, mandatory reporting as part of 
judicial ethics obligation.34 Some states that have dropped this unguided 
discretionary language for less significant professional lapses for 
lawyers, however, have retained parallel language as it applies to 
judges.35 In those jurisdictions, judges have a heightened ethical 
obligation to respond to professional violations of judges than lawyers. 
C. Judicial Ethics Obligation to Report to the Bar 
The second prong of the judge's "disciplinary responsibilities" as to 
lawyers requires that a judge with knowledge "that raises a substantial 
question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.,,36 This 
language parallels the mandatory reporting obligation of lawyers.37 This 
language appears to have been included in state versions of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct with somewhat less controversy than similar language 
in the lawyer's code, suggesting that the judge's obligation to report was 
seen on an instinctive level as more compelling-or at least causing less 
collateral damage-than a lawyer's obligation.38 It is important to note 
32. See Granholm v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 625 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) 
("Pursuant to our independent responsibility to supervise the ethical conduct of our court officers, 
this Court has raised and now addresses the issue whether the Attorney General's dual roles in this 
case as both the party appellant and as counsel for appellee PSC constitute an impermissible conflict 
of interest. "). 
33. This insight came through discussions with two members of the committee that proposed 
the most recent Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct. 
34. See, e.g., MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 30(1) (2003). 
35. See id. at Canon 30(2), 
36. Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judicial Conference use either 
the 1972 or the 1990 versions of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct as the template for their 
applicable Codes, with some local tailoring. SHAMAN, supra note 18, at § 1.01. 
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (2002); see also Abramson, 
supra note 14, at 763-66. 
38. The lawyer's duty to report has generated a good deal of discussion. See, e.g., Bruce A. 
Campbell, To Squeal or not to Squeal: A Thinking Lawyer's Guide to Reporting Lawyer 
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that since most judges are also lawyers, judges might also be required to 
report knowledge of misconduct under the applicable rules for lawyers. 39 
Professor Leslie W. Abramson's authoritative article on the 
reporting obligation of judges canvasses the subtle modifications that 
some states have made to Canon 3B(3) of the 1972 version of the Code 
and Canon 3D of the 1990 Code.40 Within the subtle variations in 
language, some general conclusions can be drawn. The obligation to 
address at least the most egregious misconduct, by reporting to the 
appropriate disciplinary body, makes clear that judges should not 
confine their role to ad hoc treatment of misconduct issues that occur in 
proceedings before them.41 On the other hand, this duty to report does 
not necessarily convert judges into gatekeepers or police monitors 
charged with minding the conduct of attorneys or the legal profession.42 
Misconduct, I FLA. COASTAL L. 1. 265,292 n.10 (1999). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The 
Attorney's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 259 (2003); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE LJ. 491 (1986); 
Douglas R. Richmond, Associates as Snitches and Rats, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1819 (1997); Ronald D. 
Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of 
Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 977 (1988); Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Comment, A Cu"ent 
Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 747 (2003). Cf Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 
Ii Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555 (2001). Mandatory 
reporting by judges has received fewer critiques. Prof. Leslie Abramson expresses concern that the 
judge's duty to report judges and other lawyers serves as a threat to judicial independence. See 
Abramson, supra note 14, at 752. 
39. It is generally assumed that the obligation under the Rules of Professional Conduct to 
report attorney misconduct applies equally to both lawyers and judges. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. and 
Preliminary Statement (1980) (indicating that the Disciplinary Rules apply to lawyers regardless of 
professional capacity); ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 581 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that judges as lawyers are bound 
by both Rule 8.3 of Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Canon 3(D)(2) of Judicial Code of 
Conduct to report lawyer misconduct); Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, 
and Representation of the indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1190 (1988). 
40. See Abramson, supra note 14, at 760-62. 
41. Cf ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING 
LAWYER SANCTIONS 5 (1986) (quoted in Abramson, supra note 14, at 754) (the ABA Committee 
has criticized judges for taking the position that "there is no such need [to initiate the disciplinary 
process] and that errant behavior of lawyers can be remedied solely by use of contempt proceedings 
and other alternative means."). Cf Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 
1987) (referring to Canon 38(3), the court stated that "we hasten to approve and encourage courts 
throughout this state in their efforts to halt unprofessional conduct and meet their responsibilities in 
reporting violations of the Code"). 
42. See, e.g., Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(rejecting reversal of judgment below based on violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by 
the prevailing party because "a direct independent undertaking of this policing role would go well 
beyond the requirements of Canon 3(D)2 [sic] of the Code of Judicial Conduct ... and create a 
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The obligation to report has been grounded in a variety of policy 
justifications, including an obligation to the system of justice as a 
whole,43 and as a means to avoid misconduct, misuse or neglect of 
duty.44 The ethical obligation of the judiciary to report violations of the 
attorney professional conduct rules that raise a substantial question as to 
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects clearly links the judge as a feeder of information to the bar 
disciplinary apparatus.45 
There is ample reason to think that judges do not embrace this 
reporting role as a central part of the judicial duties, but rather as a 
subsidiary function. Judges are not a significant source of reporting 
misconduct to the bar disciplinary apparatus.46 Courts occasionally 
reveal the challenges of reporting misconduct. As with lawyers, the 
human connection makes it "difficult" for trial judges to report "lawyers 
with whom they have to work on a day to day basis.,,47 There is a lurking 
sense that futility plays a role for some judges. A judge on the Florida 
Court of Appeals recently expressed his frustration with amazing 
candor: 
While in light of [the·lawyer's] egregious conduct, we feel duty bound 
by Canon 3D(2), Code of Judicial Conduct hereby to report him to the 
Florida Bar, we have no illusions that this will have any practical 
effect. Our skepticism is caused by the fact that, of the many occasions 
in which members of this court reluctantly and usually only after 
agonizing over what we thought was the seriousness of doing so---
have found it appropriate to make such a referral about a lawyer's 
conduct in litigation ... none has resulted in the public imposition of 
any discipline-not even a reprimand-whatever. . .. Speaking for 
himself alone, the present writer has grown tired of felling trees in the 
demand for significant increases in judicial resources."); In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1996) ("[ w]e hasten to add that we are not merely the gatekeepers who monitor and patrol 
the conduct of members of the Bar. "). 
43. See, e.g., In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d at 584 (noting that Canon 3D required reporting an 
impermissible ex parte contact; the court also used inherent power to order the attorney to appear 
before the court). 
44. See In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d at 186. 
45. See Abramson, supra note 14, at 780 ("[T]he responsibility to communicate 
unprofessional behavior becomes all the more compelling when one considers that judges comprise 
the one group that is most likely to observe or receive information regarding others' misconduct."). 
46. See Levy, supra note 2, at 105-06. 
47. State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565 (VI. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring) (overturning the 
trial court's motion to dismiss a criminal case as sanction for the State's pattern of neglect and 
misconduct in discovery matters; conviction reinstated because of lack of prejudice; matter referred 
to bar). 
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empty ethical forest which seems so much a part of the professional 
landscape in this area. Perhaps the time has come to apply instead the 
rule of conservation of judicial resources which teaches that a court 
should not require a useless act, even of itself.48 
It is difficult to discern from reported decisions how judges reach 
the decision to report a lawyer to the bar. The seriousness of the 
violation is obviously an important factor.49 Where the judge identifies 
the attorney as a repeat actor, a single act in the current litigation may 
reflect a pattern justifying a report to the appropriate disciplinary 
authority.50 Judges react most sharply to circumstances in which the 
lawyer's failure made the underlying proceeding inefficient or unfair, or 
where court-based sanctions will not stop the conduct. For example, 
courts have reported attorneys to the bar or the federal court's relevant 
committee for engaging in ex parte contact,5) failing to disclose a 
material fact of the settlement to the court,52 making statements to the 
48. Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., 778 So. 2d 443, 445 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
over ten cases in which referrals had been made). There was more to the judge's frustration: 
Id. 
In fact, the reported decisions do not reflect that the Bar has responded concretely at all 
to the tide of uncivil and unprofessional conduct which has been the subject of so much 
article-writing, sermon-giving, seminar-holding and general hand-wringing for at least 
the past twenty years .... Perhaps the ultimate example of the Bar's attitude toward the 
problem is the case of Harvey Hyman, who was the subject of three separate complaints 
by this court to the Bar. .. but who avoided any sanction by entering a diversion 
program which consisted entirely of the arduous requirement of attending a day-long 
seminar on trial ethics. 
49. Prof. Abramson identifies three factors in the judicial determination of what action is 
appropriate: "(I) the judge's level of certainty that a violation has occurred; (2) the risk of 
unfairness in the trial if a judge does not take immediate action; and (3) whether the judge is sitting 
in a state or federal court." Abramson, supra note 14, at 775. 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, III F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1096-97 (E.D. Wis. 2000) 
(holding that because the prosecutor's conduct was "not egregious, highly improper, or 
unconscionable," a sanction pursuant to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3B(3) was not 
appropriate); United States v. Hernandez-Ocampo, No. 92-101711, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2696, at 
*11-13 (9th Cir. Feb. 2,1993) (reporting misconduct of an attorney who, in an earlier case, rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel for conceding that there was no reasonable doubt as to the factual 
issues in dispute, and, in the present case, conceded his client's technical guilt). Cf In re Eicher, 661 
N.W.2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (holding that the failure of judges in individual cases to report charges 
of attorney misconduct to the bar did not indicate that charges lacked merit, particularly where each 
judge "only had one incident before them" and the present court had "the benefit of an extensive 
record with multiple complaints ... showing similar inappropriate conduct."). 
51. See In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d at 584. 
52. See AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Haw. 1996) ("By bringing and 
defending an appeal on a case that was actually moot, it appears that counsel for AIG and Vicente 
may have violated HRCP Rule 3.1 by 'wasting the time and limited resources of this court [and] 
having denied availability of the court's resources to deserving litigants[.]"'); Gum v. Dudley, 505 
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press,53 misconduct that sabotaged the trial,54 lying under oath,55 
inappropriate contact with class members,56 and neglect.57 Federal courts 
have the ability to refer serious misconduct to their own disciplinary 
apparatus or to the state body.58 Federal courts are more likely to refer to 
the state body when the misconduct did not happen in front of the 
federal court. 59 . 
Courts will sometimes hasten to add that they are not making 
findings of fact when reporting a colorable claim of serious 
misconduct. 60 State supreme courts might be inclined to avoid factual 
determinations because they may find the same issue returning to the 
court in its capacity as head of the bar disciplinary apparatus.61 
Criminal cases provide particularly interesting issues in addressing 
attorney misconduct because a case-based remedy may not stop the 
conduct. A full development of the complex issues of regulating attorney 
conduct in criminal cases is beyond the scope of this article.62 It is 
S.E.2d 391, 405 (W. Va. 1997) (although defense counsel's failure to disclose to the plaintiff that a 
settlement agreement had been reached between two co-defendants did not justify new trial, the 
matter was reported to Office of Disciplinary Counsel). 
53. See Tozzolina v. County of Orange, No. 91-56370, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17572, at *6-8 
(9th Cir. Jul. 8, 1993). 
54. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); United States 
ex rei, Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 510, 512 n.16 (N.D. III. 1983) (sending its opinion to Illinois 
Supreme Court Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission where prosecutor's outrageous 
and inflammatory conduct denied petitioner a fair trial). 
55. See Leo's Gulf Liquors v. Lakhani, 802 So. 2d 337, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
56. See Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14,23-24 (D.D.C. 2002). 
57. See Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 771-72 (W. Va. 2003). 
58. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 
TENN. L. REv. 37,59 (1993). 
59. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 512 (N.D. III. 1983) 
("Were this the record of a federal criminal trial in this Court (fortunately a non-existent possibility, 
given the quality of our United States Attorney's office), the case would clearly call for reference to 
our own lawyer disciplinary system. In light of this Court's duty under Code of Judicial Conduct 
Canon 3B(3) and Code DR 1-103(A), and given the cumulative impact of the same prosecutor's 
conduct in Shepard, a copy of this opinion is being sent to the Illinois Supreme Court Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Commission."). 
60. See In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581,584-85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
61. Interview with fonner head of State Supreme Court, (June 16,2003) (notes on file with J. 
McMorrow). 
62. This subject is well-developed in the literature. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a 
More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence, \3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 361 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of 
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be 
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 497-99 (1996); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal 
Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
69,77-91 (1995); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 
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sufficient for our purposes to note that courts occasionally find that 
while the defense counselor prosecutor's conduct does not violate 
constitutional requirements, it merits reporting to the appropriate 
disciplinary authority.63 More often than not, however, the reported 
decisions analyzing whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel 
or prosecutorial misconduct are silent on whether serious misconduct 
was reported to the bar.64 
While sending a copy of the court's opinion to the bar disciplinary 
apparatus appears to be the most common method of public referral, 
there is no logical or structural reason why referrals to the appropriate 
disciplinary body must occur in a reported decision. Referrals might be 
taking place far more often than the reported decisions indicate. This 
suggests, once again, that the reported decisions provide only a partial 
understanding of the interaction between judges and the fonnal bar 
apparatus.65 
While cases that cite the Code of Judicial Conduct offer us some 
insights, the absence of significant reference to the Code of Judicial 
VAND. L. REv. 381, 384-85 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of 
Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 225-43 (2000). 
63. For reporting of defense counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Ocampo, CA. No. 
92-1017, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2696, at *13 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 1993); United States v. Swanson, 
943 F.2d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel and 
referring a copy the of opinion to State Bar of Arizona). For reporting of prosecutors, see, e.g., 
Tozzolina v. County of Orange, No. 91-56370, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17572, at *7-8 (9th Cir. July 
8, 1993); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction but 
referring prosecutor for disciplinary action); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1985) 
(stating that disciplinary sanction rather than suppression of defendant's statement was the 
appropriate remedy for prosecutor's unethical conduct); State v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (Vt. 
1980) (affirming conviction but referring to bar). 
To bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, the applicant must explain whether a report of the ethical or legal violation has been made 
with the appropriate authorities. See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 637 (BIA 1988); see also 
Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the INS reporting obligation 
was not sacrosanct, particularly where misconduct is egregious). 
64. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel; no reference to reporting wrongdoing to bar); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. I (1967) (knowing 
use of false testimony by prosecutor; no reference to reporting wrongdoing to bar). 
65. At least one state supreme court has interpreted the confidentiality requirements of 
disciplinary matters as a reason to limit public referrals in opinions only for matters that involve 
direct misconduct that is the subject of the court's opinion. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 
562 (Vt. 2003) ("While any justice or judge can, of course, refer a complaint against a lawyer to the 
Professional Responsibility Board, we regret that the concurrence has ignored the requirements of 
confidentiality set forth in our Administrative Order No.9, Rule 12, and has done so in the public 
forum of a Supreme Court decision."). The concurrence argued that confidentiality was meant to 
apply only to disciplinary actions after the complaint was filed. Id. at 565. 
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Conduct is perhaps more compelling. As addressed in detail below, 
judges address attorney conduct issues on a daily basis. Even in the face 
of egregious conduct, judges often do not see the need to cite the Code 
of Judicial Conduct to justify the decision to sanction the attorney or 
report to the relevant bar disciplinary body. We can infer that a visceral 
understanding of the judge's role and the importance of controlling the 
proceeding before the judge provides ample independent justification for 
responding to attorney misconduct. The Code of Judicial Conduct 
simply does not give us sufficient understanding of what motivates a 
judge to respond to ethical issues that arise in the courtroom. The next 
step is to explore what judges do in their courtrooms. 
III. FEDERAL COURTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT 
A. Overview of Judicial Attitudes Reflected in Federal Court Opinions 
Through written opinions judges reveal both their vision of the 
judiciary's role in regulating attorney conduct and their vision of 
appropriate attorney conduct. 66 Admittedly there are limitations to 
attempting to glean from the pages of the Federal Reporter the attitudes 
and views of the judiciary. Written opinions provide only a one-
dimensional view of the federal courts' attitude towards attorney 
misconduct. Despite these limitations, a review of both federal district 
and appellate decisions reveals that judges do not perceive their role in 
regulating attorney conduct as an ethical mandate; nor do they appear to 
consider it a necessary component of their judicial duties.67 
A survey of the federal case law shows that judges take a fairly 
practical and holistic approach to addressing attorney conduct. Federal 
courts are focused primarily on attorney conduct that affects the 
66. The distinction between written opinions and published opinions is less significant with 
the increased access to electronic reporting. Because our goal is to discern judicial attitudes, we 
have treated written opinions designated as not for citation the same as traditionally published 
opinions. See generally Lawrence 1. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience 
or an Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215 (2004). 
67. Because our focus is on discerning judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct in 
litigation, we have not delved into the related issue of what rules of professional conduct apply in 
federal court practice. For a fuller background on this subject, see 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000) (known 
as the McDade Amendment, this section directs federal courts to apply state ethics rules to 
prosecutors in federal court); McMORROW & COQUILLETIE, supra note 8, at § 807; Bruce A. 
Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How 
Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 521-23 (1996); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv. 335, 340 (1994). 
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litigation process and the integrity of the judicial system. Federal judges 
do not perceive themselves as responsible for regulatory oversight of the 
legal profession.68 A court's choice of sanctions appears to track this 
broad focus. The type and severity of the sanction often corresponds 
with the judge's perception of whether and how much the attorney's 
behavior affected the integrity of the judicial system. One theme that 
runs consistently through the opinions is that judges believe and 
communicate, either implicitly or explicitly, that an attorney's primary 
responsibility is to the proper functioning of the system. The cases 
suggest that the concept of "officer of the court" is alive and well in 
federal court practice.69 
B. The Power to Regulate 
It is axiomatic that a federal court has the ability to supervise the 
conduct of attorneys who appear before it.70 Early in the federal court's 
evolution, the Supreme Court recognized that "[ c ]ourts of justice are 
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with 
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and 
submission to their lawful mandates.,,71 The Court later acknowledged 
that these powers included a court's ability to discipline attorneys who 
appear before it.72 A court's ability to discipline attorneys derives not 
just from its inherent powers,73 but also from various statutory 
68. Professors Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green offer a rich analysis of the federal court 
authority to regulate lawyers, giving an apt subtitle of "A Practice in Search of a Theory." See 
generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 2. How judges act-the practice-appears to be as much 
or more the product of the judge's vision of his or her judicial role than a measured analysis of the 
judge's power to sanction attorneys. 
69. See generally Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1173 (10th CiT. 2003) 
("This is justified because attorney misconduct both implicates the attorney's fitness to function as 
an officer of the court and triggers the court's responsibility to protect the public from unscrupulous 
or unqualified practitioners."); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Because 
lawyers are officers of the court which granted admission, such courts are necessarily vested with 
the authority, within certain limits, to impose reasonable sanctions for lawyer misconduct."); Canon 
v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 676 F. Supp. 823, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Attorneys are officers of the 
court, and their first duty is to the administration of justice. "). 
70. See generally McMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8, at § 807. See also Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991). 
71. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821). 
72. See Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824). 
73. See Chambers, SOl U.S. at 43. For a thorough discussion of the various sources of power 
to regulate attorney conduct in federal court practice, see generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 
2. 
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provisions,74 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure/5 and the district 
courts' local rules.76 Some commentators have even suggested that 
federal courts might have broad, independent· authority to regulate 
attorneys. 77 
While there is no doubt that federal courts have the power to 
discipline attorney misconduct, it is less clear whether, when, or how a 
court will use its power. District courts have described the ability to 
supervise attorney conduct as a "duty" or a "fundamental 
responsibility.,,7s One district court, relying on Ex Parte Burr, concluded 
that "[ c ]ourts are required mandatorily to exercise this duty to preserve 
judicial decorum and to enforce the respectability of the legal 
profession.,,79 While the courts use mandatory language when they 
describe their power to act, it is readily apparent that courts perceive 
their ability to sanction attorney misconduct as a discretionary tool rather 
than an obligatory role. 
Courts have expressed differing views on what role a federal court 
plays in regulating attorney conduct. The Second and Fifth Circuits' 
decisions defining the role of the federal judiciary in regulating attorney 
conduct illustrate the contrasting philosophies. The Second Circuit has 
taken the position that "[t]he business of the court is to dispose of 
litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who 
practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause 
before it."sO Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, ethical issues that 
surface during the course of litigation are better addressed by the 
74. See, e.g., 28 U.S.e. § 1927 (2004). 
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. II; FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); FED. R. APP. P. 46. Rule II of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an example of a procedural rule that incorporates an ethical 
mandate and gives it force. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Rule J I and Federalizing Lawyer 
Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 959 (1991). 
76. See, e.g., M.D. ALA. U.S. D.C. LOCAL R. 83.1; D. ARK. U.S.D.e. LOCAL R. 4; D.D.C. 
U.S.D.e. LOCAL R. 16.2. 
77. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 2. 
78. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 862 (W.O. Mo. 1980) (quoting Universal Athletic 
Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.O. Pa. 
1973); see also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J. v. Phillip, 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344-45 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (commenting that it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that the standards of ethics 
remain high); Terrebone, Ltd. of Cal. v. Murray, I F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (E.D. Cal. 1998) 
79. United States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. III, 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); see also, Black, 
492 F. Supp. at 859 (noting that "[a] fundamental responsibility of any trial court is the supervision 
of attorneys who appear and practice before it."); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 
382 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (recognizing courts have a duty "to supervise the conduct of the attorneys 
appearing before it and from its obligation to see that it and the legal system do not fall into 
disrepute"). 
80. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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"comprehensive disciplinary machinery of the state and federal bar, ... 
or possibly by legislation.,,81 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has "squarely 
rejected this hands-off approach," instead holding that district courts are 
"obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in 
connection with any proceeding before it.,,82 According to the Fifth 
Circuit "it is not clear that the vitality of state enforcement is relevant to 
the judicial duty of the federal courts to clean its own house.,,83 
As these two approaches aptly illustrate, the appellate decisions 
suggest that there is significant uncertainty about a federal judge's role 
in regulating attorney misconduct. The philosophical differences, 
however, are not as sharp in practice. District courts, even those within 
the two circuits, appear to have adopted a hybrid approach-focusing 
their attention on conduct that sullies the underlying litigation and 
judicial system but relying primarily on their own power to sanction 
attorney misconduct rather than the available state enforcement 
mechanisms.84 Courts are concerned primarily with whether an 
attorney's behavior taints the judicial process and by implication the 
system as a whole.85 Preservation of popular faith with the judicial 
system is the court's foremost consideration.86 As the Fourth Circuit 
observed, "As soon as the process falters ... the people are then justified 
in abandoning support for the system in favor of one where honesty is 
preeminent.,,87 As a result, courts are willing to act sua sponte, 
identifying attorney behavior that may have an adverse affect on the 
proceedings.88 The power to regulate emanates not from ethical 
81. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 
590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
82. In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th CiT. 1992) (quoting Woods v. Covington 
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(noting that a district court judge may deal directly with an ethical violation or refer it to the 
committee on grievance, or both); MacDraw v. Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253, 
1262 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "a district court need not hesitate to impose penalties for 
unreasonable conduct and acts of bad faith."); NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc. 
124 F.R.O. 120, 146 (W.O. La. 1989) (using inherent powers to sanction an attorney and sending a 
copy of the opinion to the Board of Bar Overseers in Massachusetts and Louisiana). 
85. See Giardina v. Ruth U. Fertal, Inc., 110 Civ. A. 00-1674, 2001 WL 1628597, at *3 (E.O. 
La. Dec. 17, 2001); United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Telectronics Propriety, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc. 836 F .2d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d CiT. 1988); IBM Corp. v. 
Levin, 579 F .2d 271, 283 (3d CiT. 1978); United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp. 203, 210 
(W.D.N.Y. 1993); Koch v. Koch, Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1530 n.2 (D. Kan. 1992). 
87. Schaffer Equip. Co., II F.3d at 457. 
88. See, e.g., Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2003); Tapers v. Local 530 of 
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mandates but from the general duty to preserve the integrity of the 
system.89 
Despite the Second Circuit's suggestion, federal courts relatively 
rarely rely on the state disciplinary system to regulate attorney 
misconduct in their courts.90 A court is more likely to refer an attorney to 
an internal disciplinary committee for investigation and oversight.91 A 
federal judge's decision to refer to the federal court's disciplinary 
committee rather than to the state's disciplinary committee may reflect 
the view expressed by the Fifth Circuit that federal courts are 
responsible for cleaning their own house.92 In addition, both federal 
district courts and federal appellate courts have their own admission 
requirements, informal and formal rules of conduct, and an inherent 
power to sanction. Moreover, a referral to a disciplinary committee, 
whether internal or at the state level, is just one of many tools available 
to a federal judge. Indeed, a review of the written opinions reveals that 
federal courts rely less on referral and more on the variety of creative 
sanctions they have devised to address attorney misconduct.93 
But in the end, whether a court confronts attorney misconduct and 
how it responds to the behavior is largely left to the individual court's 
Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons, No. 93-CV-154 (1O), 1996 WL 1088933, at *4 (E.D.N.Y 
Oct. 24, 1996); In re Chou-Chen Chemicals, Inc., 31 B.R. 842, 851 n.35 (Bankr. W.D. Ky 1983) 
("The court should sua sponte raise ethical problems involving danger to a just, speedy, and 
inexpensive remedy."). See also FED. R. CIV. P. II(c}(I}(8} (authorizing the court to act sua sponte 
in imposing sanctions when it finds attorney misconduct). 
89. See Gadda v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 861, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2004); Schaffer Equip. Co., 11 
F.3d at 458 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (I 944}}; 
United States ex rei. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
90. Courts appear to rely on a state disciplinary mechanism when (I) they do not have the 
ability to refer to a court's disciplinary committee because the attorney is not a member of the bar; 
or (2) the behavior is perceived as exceptiona\1y egregious. Federal courts are more likely to refer to 
a state disciplinary apparatus where the conduct under review occurred in state court. See. e.g., 
United States ex rei. Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 512 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Were this the 
record of a federal criminal trial in this Court (fortunately a non-existent possibility, given the 
quality of our United States Attorney's office), the case would clearly ca\1 for reference to our own 
lawyer disciplinary system. In light of this Court's duty under the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 
38(3} and Code DR 1-103(A}, and given the cumulative impact of the same prosecutor's conduct in 
Shepard, a copy of this opinion is being sent to the Illinois Supreme Court Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Commission."}. 
91. See. e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (D. Md. 2002); 
Higginbotham v. KCS Intern., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 444, 460 (D. Md. 2001). 
92. See. e.g., Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (stating that the Court is required to "refer 
this matter to this Court's disciplinary committee."). 
93. See infra Part 1l1.E. 
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discretion.94 Thus, while the power to regulate is beyond peradventure, it 
is not at all clear what will be regulated. An attorney is not insulated 
from sanctions simply because he or she follows the rules of 
professional conduct. While courts certainly employ the ethical rules 
established by the profession as benchmarks, the rules do not establish 
an exclusive list of sanctionable conduct nor do they provide insight on 
appropriate sanctions. While an attorney's ethical violation certainly 
impugns the integrity of the system, other conduct can be seen as 
undermining the judicial process and system without being labeled 
unethical. 
C. What Conduct District Courts Are Regulating 
At the forefront of judicial opinions addressing attorney misconduct 
is the court's concern with conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
judicial system,95 the public's confidence in its proper functioning,96 
and--coming in a more distant third-the integrity of the bar.97 As a 
result, courts will sanction attorneys for, among other things, making 
misleading statements to the court98 or opposing attorneys,99 refusing or 
repeatedly failing to follow court orders, 100 including scheduling 
94. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (recognizing that 
appellate courts should apply a deferential standard of review to district court decisions to sanction); 
Gadda, 363 F.3d at 873; Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 444. 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Taleo, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Douglas v. 
DynMcDermott Petro. Op. Co., 144 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1998); Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 239 F. 
Supp. 2d 1022,1031 (D. Mont. 2003); Tec Air, Inc. v. Nippondenso Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 91C 4488, 
1999 WL 965418, at *2 (N.D. III. Sept. 30,1999); Kirschner v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals, 159 F.R.D. 
391,399 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
96. See Black v. Mo., 492 F. Supp. 848, 873 (W.D. Mo. 1980). See also Erickson v. Newmar 
Corp., 87 F.3d 298,303 (9th Cir. 1996); Ayus v. TotalRenal Care, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 
(S.D. Tex. 1999); Pendleton v. Cent. N.M. COIT. Facility, 184 F.R.D. 637, 641 (D.N.M. 1999) 
(implying that the misconduct in question contributes to the public's perception of the way the 
judicial system functions). 
97. See, e.g., In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211, 225 (4th Cir. 2002); Douglas, 144 F.3d at 370; 
Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1965); In re Haley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 926,927 (E.D. 
Ark. 1999). 
98. See Lasar, 239 F. Supp. at 1033. 
99. See Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md. 2002); Brown v. 
County of Genesee, 694 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse 
and Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507,512 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
100. See Hawkins v. AT&T Corp., No. SA-02-CA-0166-RF, 2003 WL 22736525, at *2 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 12,2003); Grine v. Coombs, 214 F.R.D. 312, 369 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
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orders,lol and exhibiting a lack of civility. 102 Almost without exception, 
courts emphasize a lawyer's duty to the judicial system as a whole when 
imposing sanctions. l03 
Courts will sanction conduct that occurs at any point in the 
litigation process-both inside and outside of the courtroom. 104 The 
court's focus is not where the conduct occurred but how the behavior is 
affecting the judicial process and the fair administration of justice. lOS 
Outside the courtroom, discovery disputes and misleading settlement 
negotiations often raise the ire of the courts. Courts appear to address 
attorney misconduct most frequently during the course of discovery 
when attorneys are vying for tactical advantage. 106 Courts are most likely 
to sanction discovery disputes after they have consumed an inordinate 
amount of court resources and have required repeated court 
interventions. l07 In addition, courts have little tolerance for behavior 
101. See Bagby v. Attorney General of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 4663 (JSRDF), 2004 WL 324896, at 
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004); Santos Sanchez v. Hosp. Menonita de Cayey, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 12, 
14-15 (D.P.R. 2003). 
102. See Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64-65 (D.NJ. 2001); In re First City 
Bankcorp. of Tex., Inc., 270 B.R. 807,813 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Saldana v. Krnart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 
2d 629,639 (D.V.I. 1999). 
103. See United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., II F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The general 
duty of candor and truth thus takes its shape from the larger object of preserving the integrity of the 
judicial system."); In re Grievance Comm. of United States Dist. Ct., 847 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 
1988)( observing that "most code provisions [] obligate an attorney to take affirmative measures to 
preserve the integrity of the judicial system"); Schmude ex rei. Schmude v. Sheahan, No. 00 C4580, 
2004 WL 1045798, at *22 (N.D. III. May 4, 2004) ("Lawyers therefore are responsible ... for 
maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently .... "); Shade v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting the duty of candor 
"takes it shape from the larger object of preserving the integrity of the judicial system"). 
104. See In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211, 216 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court decision to 
disbar attorney for conduct that occurred while his license to practice was suspended); Ausherman, 
212 F. Supp. 2d at 443; Higginbotham v. KCS In!'l, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 444, 445 (D. Md. 2001). 
\05. Courts are even willing to sanction attorney conduct that effects the integrity of the 
litigation when an attorney never makes an appearance in the case. In Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson 
Tool Company, 62 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit set aside a jury verdict because of 
the conduct of an in-house corporate counsel who participated in the trial but never made an 
appearance, was not admitted pro hac vice, and did not file any documents as an officer of the court. 
Id. at 1131-32. 
\06. See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210-11 (1999) (Kennedy, 1., 
concurring) ("Delays and abuses in discovery are the source of widespread injustice .... Trial 
courts must have the capacity to ensure prompt compliance with their orders, especially when 
attorneys attempt to abuse the discovery process to gain a tactical advantage.") The Supreme Court 
recently held that allowing an immediate appeal of Rule 37 sanctions would undermine the purpose 
of the rule which was "designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing 
tactics during the discovery process." Jd. at 208. 
107. See Abou-Sakher v. McCoy, No. 98-6704, 2000 WL 1562839, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. II, 
2000); Keams v. Wood Motors, Inc., No. 96-1314, 1997 WL 18817, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 1997); 
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during discovery that is aggressive rather than adversarial. 108 But 
discovery disputes are not the only target of court review. An attorney's 
conduct in settlement negotiations will also be scrutinized. 109 
Specifically, courts will admonish and sanction attorneys for their lack 
of candor during settlement talks. 110 As one court aptly noted "[i]t is just 
as damaging to the integrity of our adversary system for an attorney 
knowingly to make a false statement of material fact to an opposing 
counsel during settlement negotiations, as it is to lie to a lawyer or the 
. d· "Ill JU ge III court. 
A recurring theme throughout the opinions is the federal court's 
concern for the proper allocation of judicial resources. Federal courts 
readily sanction conduct that is perceived as wasting judicial 
resources.
112 Courts cite to two primary reasons for these sanctions. 
First, often an attorney's failure to comply with defined time 
constraints-especially if compliance must be compelled by the court-
is perceived as undermining the integrity of the system. I 13 The 
connection between the waste of judicial resources and the integrity of 
the system is most readily revealed in a court's response to discovery 
delays.114 Courts perceive an attorney's dilatory tactics in discovery as 
an attempt to obfuscate the truth-the very thing the judicial system is 
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1539-42 (11 th Cir. 1993) (describing the district 
court's repeated interventions and orders to compel discovery before imposing sanctions). 
108. See Parker v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1006. 1013 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) ("As we have emphasized before, the boundaries of ethical responsibilities must not be 
trampled by aggressive lawyering. This Court cannot condone discovery abuses and violations of 
our Rules of Professional Responsibility and Local Rules by turning a blind eye to practices that 
undermine the cases before us and the judicial system as a whole."); Higginbotham, 202 F.R.D. at 
446 (sanctioning attorneys for conduct during depositions that was uncivil, "purely retaliatory, 
entirely knowing and purposeful and thus utterly out-of-bounds"); Saldana v. K-MART Corp., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 629, 638 (D.V.l. 1999) (sanctioning attorney for her abrasive conduct toward opposing 
counsel including the use of profanity during telephone calls). 
109. See Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44. 
110. See id.; see also Pendleton v. Central N.M. Corr. Facility, 184 F.R.D. 637, 641 (D.N.M. 
1999). 
Ill. Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 444. 
112. See Durham v. Lewis, No. 98-1761,1998 WL 846890, at -3 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998); 
Williams v. State, No. C 00-1461-EDL, 2003 WL 151533, at -2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14,2003); Fla. 
Software Sys., Inc. v. ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla. 
2000); Beers v. GM Corp., No. 97-CV-482 (NPMlDNH), 1999 WL 325378, at -4 (N.D.N.Y. May 
17,1999). 
113. See Saudi v. Valmet-Appleton, 219 F.R.D. 128, 134 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Brown v. Iowa, 
152 F.R.D. 168, 177 (S.D. Ia. 1993). 
114. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 987 F.2d 1536,1546 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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meant to promote. 115 Second, the efficiency of the system is seen as 
inextricably linked to the public's confidence in it. More than one court 
has noted that the delays and adversarial foot-dragging is "exactly the 
type of conduct that the public finds abhorrent and that contributes to the 
low esteem that the bar is currently trying to reverse.,,116 
The court's role as guardian of judicial resources creates a 
significant question about the court's optimal role in regulating attorney 
conduct.117 There is significant tension between the costs in judicial 
resources related to overseeing attorney conduct and the costs related to 
taking a "hands off approach." A judge's decision about the level of his 
or her involvement in discovery disputes illustrates the tension inherent 
in trying to define the parameters of the court's role as overseer. On the 
one hand, a judge may take a more active approach and encourage 
attorneys to seek the court's guidance if they reach an impasse in 
discovery. While this approach may result in a more expedited discovery 
process, it also may result in the judge spending judicial resources 
presiding over subsidiary and often unnecessary disputes. On the other 
hand, a judge may take a "hands off approach," requiring attorneys to 
grapple with discovery issues without court. guidance. While this 
approach leaves the judge free to attend to other court business, it raises 
the possibility that significant resources will be spent as attorneys 
struggle to resolve discovery issues without court intervention. The latter 
approach contains an additional hidden cost for the judicial system. In 
instances when the case involves parties with unequal financial 
resources, the court's unwillingness to address attorney misconduct early 
in the process may interfere with the proper functioning of the judicial 
liS. See id. at 1546-47. 
116. Pendleton, 184 F.R.D. at 641; see also Geisennan v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 792 (5th 
Cir. 1990) ("Delays [in litigation] are a particularly abhorrent feature of today's trial practice. They 
increase the cost of litigation, to the detriment of the parties enmeshed in it; they are one factor 
causing disrespect for lawyers and the judicial process; and they fuel the increasing resort to means 
of non-judicial dispute resolution. Adherence to reasonable deadlines is critical to restoring integrity 
in court proceedings."). 
117. See Hill v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (Parsons, J., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("Strong judicial management is a potential threat to the 
adversary system as it has existed for hundreds of years because it calls for a significant change in 
the power relationship between judges and lawyers and in their respective functions. Indeed, there 
are risks in imposing a meaningful duty on attorneys to act in the interests of the judicial system, 
rather than eXclusively in that of their clients, and in placing enforcement of that duty in the hands 
of the judges, whose primary concern could well become efficiency rather than justice itself."). 
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system. 118 District court judges must consider these hidden costs when 
they consider their role in addressing attorney misconduct. 
D. What Appellate Courts Are Regulating 
Appellate courts have three distinct roles in regulating attorney 
conduct. First, appellate courts review a district court's decision whether 
to sanction and what sanction to impose. Second, appellate courts may 
independently evaluate the district court record and impose sanctions. 
Third, appellate courts recognize a separate and distinct duty to regulate 
attorney misconduct that occurs at the appellate level. 119 
Regardless of their role, appellate courts, like district courts, are 
primarily concerned with the integrity of the judicial system and the fair 
and efficient administration of justice. Appellate courts, however, appear 
to address attorney misconduct in a broader context. District court 
judges primarily focus on how the attorney's conduct affected the 
litigation before the court, with a secondary focus on how that conduct 
affects the judicial system as a whole. In contrast, appellate courts are 
more likely to view attorney misconduct through a broader systemic 
lens-assessing the impact the attorney's behavior on the integrity of the 
judicial system. 
1. Appellate Courts' Review of District Court Sanctions 
In theory, appellate courts review district courts' sanctions under an 
abuse of discretion standard. 120 The standard is lenient because, as 
appellate courts recognize, district courts are primarily responsible for 
the supervision of the attorneys practicing before them. 121 In practice, 
however, appellate courts appear to adopt a two-tiered approach to 
reviewing district court decisions. The first tier addresses the decision to 
118. See generany Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing 
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2204-05 (1989) (discussing costs of litigation and noting 
that in survey of 1000 judges, "abusive discovery was rated highest among the reasons for the high 
cost of litigation"); see also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (11th CiT. 
1997) (noting that "discovery imposes burdens on the judicial system; scarce judicial resources must 
be diverted from other cases to resolve discovery disputes"). 
119. See McMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8, at § 803.01 (discussing FED. R. App. P. 
46 as a tool for regulating attorney conduct before appellate courts). 
120. See First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 
2002). But see In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating "a district court's 
ruling upon a motion to disqualify is not a matter of discretion."). 
121. See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 (9th CiT. 1996); Gas-A-Tron of Ariz. v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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sanction and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The 
second tier addresses the sanction imposed and a different, and perhaps 
more stringent, standard of review is applied. 122 One court described its 
second-tier review as determining whether the sanction imposed was 
"juSt.,,123 While the majority of district court responses to attorney 
misconduct are affinned, appellate courts have reversed district court 
decisions to sanction,124 and in rare cases, not to sanction. 125 
The appellate courts' two-tiered approach to reviewing district 
court decisions appears to reflect the different perspectives of the two 
courts. Appellate courts recognize that the district court judge is in the 
best position to decide whether a sanction is warranted. 126 District court 
judges have observed the attorney's behavior and the impact of that 
behavior on the litigation process. But the decision whether to sanction 
is distinct from the decision how to sanction. As will be discussed more 
fully in Part E of this section, the type of sanction imposed is often a 
reflection of whether the attorney's misconduct challenged the proper 
functioning of the underlying litigation or whether the misconduct 
undermined the integrity of the system as a whole. 
Because appellate courts view the type of sanction imposed through 
a broader systemic lens, they are more likely to scrutinize the type of 
sanction imposed to determine whether it accurately reflects the 
egregiousness of the conduct. 127 Appellate courts, removed from the fray 
and intensity of the trial process, caution district courts to use restraint 
when exercising their power to regulate attorney conduct and to 
122. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1543 (11th Cir. 1993). 
123. /d. 
124. See Gas-A-Tron, 536 F.2d at 1325 (reversing a district court decision to disqualify an 
attorney); In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979). 
125. See Erickson, 87 F.3d at 303-304; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885 
(5th Cir. 1988). 
126. See Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344,352 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that the district court is in 
a better position to decide what sanctions are appropriate for the misconduct); Motorola Inc. v. 
Interdigital Technology Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1468 (Fed Cir. 1997) ("The trial judge is better able 
to assess the conduct of parties appearing before it than is this court. Questions of misconduct often 
involve the tone and tenor of advocacy, rather than the literal words of the advocate. In such 
instances, a cold printed record cannot fully convey the aspects of conduct that a trial court might 
find egregious. Thus, this court is careful to avoid substituting its assessment of facts for those of 
the judge who experienced them firsthand."); Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1,3 
(1st Cir.1993) ("A district court, which has direct and continuous contact with attorneys, is best able 
to judge in the first instance whether an attorney's misconduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant 
the 'death knell' of a lawsuit, or whether some lesser sanction would be more appropriate."); Blue v. 
United States Dep't of the Anny, 914 F.2d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 1990). 
127. See United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., II F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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narrowly tailor the sanctions imposed.128 The severity of the sanction 
must match the perceived egregiousness of the conduct. 129 Although 
rules and statutes outlining appropriate conduct and possible sanctions 
are often written in broad language, a district court's discretion in 
imposing a sanction is not unbridled. l3O So while a district court's 
decision to sanction is reviewed with deference, the decision how to 
sanction appears to receive more scrutiny. 
2. Appellate Court's Response to Attorney Misconduct 
Beyond the review of district court sanctions, appellate courts 
acknowledge that they too have a responsibility to supervise attorney 
conduct and, consistent with that recognition, take an active role in 
regulating attorney conduct. 131 When addressing attorney conduct, the 
appellate court uses the same systemic approach that influences their 
review of district court decisions. The appellate courts evince a 
willingness to sanction attorney conduct that occurs before the appellate 
courts as well as behavior that occurred but was not caught or 
recognized in the district courts. 132 Under this rubric, appellate courts are 
not only addressing conduct that affects the appellate process but also 
conduct that was perceived as affecting the litigation process below.133 
Like district courts, appellate courts are willing to raise sua sponte the 
128. See id. (affirming the imposition of sanctions, but vacating the type); see also Webb v. 
District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Doyle v. Murray, 938 F.2d 33, 35 
(4th Cir. 1991)(same). 
129. See Richardson v. Boddie-Noell Enter. Inc., No. 03-1011, 2003 WL 22429534, at *4 (4th 
Cir. Oct. 27, 2003); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 646-47 (l985) (reversing an appellate 
court's suspension of an attorney for a harsh and ill-mannered letter criticizing the court's 
administration). 
130. See Richardson, 2003 WL 22429534, at *4 (comparing the broad language in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) allowing a court to dismiss a case for failure to comply with a rules of 
procedure with conduct appropriate to necessitate dismissal); Berry v. CignaiRSI-Cigna, 975 F.2d 
1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that a district court must expressly determine that a lesser 
sanction would not deter conduct or the record must show that the district court employed a lesser 
sanction that proved to be futile). 
131. See Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., No. 98-4606, 1999 WL 292667, at *4 
(11th Cir. May II, 1999); In re Beck, 902 F .2d 5, 7 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is an important part of the 
judicial office to ensure competence and dedication of the bar, as well as its adherence to ethical 
standards."); see also FED. R. CIY. P 46(b) (allowing for discipline if an attorney is "guilty of 
conduct unbecoming a member of the court's bar"). 
132. See, e.g., V.l. Hous. Auth. v. David, 823 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1987) (sanctioning an 
attorney when, on appeal, it was discovered he made misrepresentations to the district court). 
133. See, e.g., Top Entm't, Inc. v. Ortega, 285 F.3d 115, 118 (1st CiT. 2002) (making an 
independent assessment that the original complaint violated Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
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propriety of sanctions. 134 Consistent with their systemic approach, even 
if a motion for sanctions is brought by the opposing attorney, appellate 
courts will look beyond the motion and investigate an attorney's history 
of misconduct. 135 
Like the district courts, appellate courts are extremely sensitive to 
conduct that wastes judicial resources 136 and they have little tolerance 
for attorneys who abuse the appellate process. 137 It is commonly 
recognized that a court should discipline attorneys who harass their 
opponents and waste judicial resources by abusing the legal process. 138 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides· the basis for 
"penalizing this waste of appellate resources,,,139 and it is frequently 
cited to support sanctions imposed at the appellate level. The waste of 
appellate resources encompasses a broad array of conduct from filing a 
groundless appeal140 to failing to properly cite to the record in an 
appellate brief. 141 Like the district courts, appellate courts link the 
protection of judicial resources to both the integrity of the system and 
the public's confidence in it. 142 Courts cite to the mounting federal case 
loads and the growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of 
litigation as the basis for sanctions designed to discourage groundless 
134. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1988) ijler curiam). 
135. See In re Bagdade, 334 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Bagdade's conduct 
led the appellees to seek sanctions, which in turn led us to inquire whether he had been sanctioned 
before."). 
136. See Jenkins v. Tatem, 795 F.2d 112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (commenting that due to the 
"back log" of cases pending appellate review "the parties' paper vendetta in this court is particularly 
inexcusable because of the heavy volume oflegitimate business in this court."). 
137. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d, at 809 (stating that a frivolous appeal is an unjustified 
consumption of appellate resources); Bank of Canton, Ltd v. Republic Nat'! Bank, 636 F.2d 30, 31 
(2d Cir. 1980) (commenting that the "appeal is so completely frivolous as to render its prosecution 
an abuse of appellate process"). 
138. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 341 (2d Cir. 1999). 
139. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 815; see, e.g., Duran v. N.M. Dep't of Labor, No. 01-2329, 
2002 WL 1462861, at *3 (10th Cir. July 9,2002); Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 177 F.3d 791, 793 
(5th Cir. 1994); Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991); Schiff v. United 
States, No. 90-5025, 1990 WL 120619, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
140. See In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2000); Wilton Corp. v. 
Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670,676 (6th Cir. 1999). 
141. See Day v. N. Ind. Pub. Servo Corp., 164 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1999) (commenting that 
the purposes of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6) was to provide pinpoint citations 
so judges could readily find the facts). 
142. See Chudasarna V. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (I lth Cir. 1997) ("Allowing 
a case to proceed through the pretrial processes with an invalid claim that increases the costs of the 
case does nothing but waste the resources of the litigants in the action before the court, delay 
resolution of disputes between other litigants, squander scarce judicial resources, and damage the 
integrity and the public's perception ofthe federal judicial system."). 
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litigation. 143 As one court stated "[t]he courts-public, tax-supported 
institutions--cannot be used to vent spleen or passion amongst feuding 
parties and members of the bar.,,144 
E. The Federal Courts' Use a/Sanctions 
to Address Attorney Misconduct 
What is most revealing about a judge's attitude toward attorney 
misconduct is what sanction he or she imposes on an offending attorney. 
Why one judge chooses to impose one sanction when confronted with 
certain behavior and another judge, confronted with similar behavior, 
chooses another sanction, or no sanction at all, is unclear from a review 
of written opinions. The varying results probably have as much to do 
with the circumstances of each case as they do with the particular 
judge's views on attorney conduct and his or her role in regulating it, the 
history of the litigation, the reputation of the attorney and innumerable 
other factors not obvious on the face of the opinion. 
Although it is difficult to establish a clear definition of what type of 
sanction will be used and when, several patterns do emerge. A judge's 
choice of sanction often reflects the judge's perception of the impact of 
the conduct on the underlying litigation as well as the integrity of the 
judicial system: the broader the impact, the harsher the sanction. If an 
attorney's conduct is perceived as adversarial excess that merely 
affected the current litigation, a "lighter" sanction will be imposed. In 
those instances, courts will impose a sanction designed to make the other 
side whole such as the payment of costs and fees. In contrast, if the 
attorney's conduct is viewed as undermining the integrity of the judicial 
system as a whole then a court will impose more severe and often 
mUltiple sanctions. 
Federal courts are armed with a large arsenal of possible sanctions 
designed to protect both the litigation process and the broader judicial 
system. Sanctions can be loosely defined by two broad categories: 
traditional sanctions and informal sanctions. Traditional sanctions are 
often rule-based and encompass the long-established responses to 
attorney misconduct such as the assessment of fees and costs, 
disqualification, and referral to a disciplinary committee, which can 
143. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam); Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1291 (5th CiT. 1983); Dreis & Krump Mfg, 
Co. v.lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 1975). 
144. Jenkins v. Tatum, 795 F.2d 112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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suspend or disbar the attorney from the particular federal court's bar. 
These sanctions are designed primarily to ensure the integrity of the 
system and regulate conduct before the court. 
In contrast, informal sanctions are not rooted in rules or statutes, 
nor are they recognized as "official" responses to attorney conduct. 
Informal sanctions include a court's decision to issue an opinion, naming 
the recalcitrant attorney, outlining his or her misdeeds in detail, and 
describing the court's disappointment and outrage. Informal sanctions do 
not employ the state or federal disciplinary machinery or rely on 
disciplinary mechanisms described in rules or statutes. Instead they 
combine the power of the written word with the importance of an 
attorney's reputation to impress upon an attorney (and the bar) the 
gravity of the conduct. And unlike traditional sanctions, informal 
sanctions are more efficient because they do not entail an adherence to 
due process requirements. 
While traditional sanctions provide federal courts an avenue for 
addressing and deterring attorney misconduct, informal sanctions allow 
courts to reveal to the bar their vision of attorney conduct. Unlike 
traditional sanctions, which require a court to defend its action based on 
the conduct before it, informal sanctions allow a court to speak more 
broadly-a podium-about an attorney's responsibility to the system. 
Pendleton v. Central New Mexico Correctional Facilityl45 provides a 
recent illustration. The court in Pendleton lacked a traditional basis for 
sanctions but observed "the conduct of Plaintiffs counsel deserves 
mention.,,146 The court went on to express a common sentiment: 
Practicing law transcends gamesmanship and making a buck. We 
should be trying to make a difference. The profession is more than a 
business, and should remain so. As professionals we should, while 
trying to solve our client's problems, make every effort to avoid 
needless litigation. The conduct employed in this case certainly was 
not calculated to achieve that end. 147 . 
145. 184 F.R.D. 637 (D.N.M. 1999). 
146. Jd. at 641. 
147. Jd.; see also Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir 1993) ("The 
discovery rules in particular were intended to promote the search for truth that is the heart of our 
judicial system. However, the success with which the rules are applied towards this search for truth 
greatly depends on the professionalism and integrity of the attorneys involved. Therefore, it is 
appalling that attorneys, like defense counsel in this case, routinely twist the discovery rules into 
some of 'the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of those who abuse the adversary system for the 
sole benefit of their clients."'). 
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While traditional sanctions and infonnal sanctions are often used in 
tandem, it is through infonnal sanctions that courts communicate 
directly with the attorneysl48 and the bar. 149 Courts attempt to describe 
and establish nonns of conduct and to guide the bar's behavior. ISO 
Because courts are speaking directly to the bar, infonnal sanctions offer 
a window into the federal bench's attitude toward attorney misconduct. 
Again and again, courts emphasize through infonnal sanctions that an 
attorney's foremost obligation is to the judicial system. lSI Sanctions are 
frequently assessed when attorneys fail to maintain this perspective. 1S2 
F. Final Comments on Federal Court Judicial Attitudes Toward 
Regulating Attorney Conduct 
By looking at what judges do-the sanctions imposed-when 
confronted with attorney conduct and the language they use in imposing 
those sanctions, we see a picture of judges who are not aggressively 
seeking to regulate the legal profession as a whole. The concerns for the 
legal profession are derivative of the dominant concern for the integrity 
of the judicial proceeding in front of the jUdge. Within that narrower 
context, judges reflect an often deep concern for misconduct, both 
because it hanns the integrity of the proceeding and adversely affects the 
legal profession. While this conclusion may seem obvious, it reflects at 
148. See Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1034 (D. Mont. 2003) ("[Sutter's] 
actions were contemptuous, necessitated a mistrial, and caused undue expense and delay to Lasar, 
his counsel, the witnesses, and the Court. In trying to defend his actions, he has been dishonest, 
misleading, and evasive. In short, he is not the type of attorney that should be practicing in this 
Court. At some point, Lawrence Sutter needs to reflect on what he does, and what it is he should do. 
The law has no room for frustrated advocates, motivated by an attitude to win at any cost, who are 
intent to take matters in their own hands, without regard to the rules or orders of the Court."). 
149. See United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We do not think 
formal disciplinary action required [sic] in the circumstances, but we take this opportunity to remind 
the bar of its duty to avoid needless duplication in the briefing of multiple-party appeals. "); Zal v. 
Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1992) ("During a trial, lawyers must speak, each in his own 
time and within his allowed time, and with relevance and moderation. These are such obvious 
matters that we should not remind the bar of them were it nor for the misconceptions manifest in 
this case."). 
150. See Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., No. 98-4606, 1999 WL 292667, at *4 
(11th Cir. May II, 1999) ("Unfortunately, we must remind these attorneys that they are officers of 
the court. As such, they 'owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the court before 
which they practice.' These duties are never subservient to a lawyer's duty to advocate zealously for 
his or her client. In this case, the attorneys for both parties have frustrated the system of justice, 
which depends on their candor and loyalty to the court, because they wanted to avoid an unpleasant 
truth about their clients' conduct. 'In short, they have sold out to the client.'" (citations omitted)). 
151. See infra Part IV. 
152. See In re Sealed Appellant, 194 F.3d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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least one reason why federal courts have not pushed for the 
federalization of legal ethics or the creation of federal rules of attorney 
conduct. 153 
IV. STATE COURT ATTITUDES TOWARD ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT 
A. Theoretical Difference Between Federal and State Courts 
If we are rightly concerned that the published opinions from federal 
courts offer only a partial picture of judicial attitudes, this concern is 
exacerbated at the state level because opinions of state trial courts are 
often unpublished. Consequently, we were required to rely largely on 
state appellate court opinions, removing us one step from the trial court 
judges who most often are the ones confronting directly the alleged 
misconduct. In addition, we were dealing with a much larger body of 
cases and the inevitable problem of generalizing from a wide range of 
published opinions. 
We initially theorized that there would be differences between how 
federal and state court judges view their responsibility in regulating 
attorney conduct. State courts traditionally have supervisory 
responsibility over the legal profession within their states.154 Because of 
their position within the state legal system and their role in promUlgating 
rules of professional responsibility, state judges are more closely 
associated with the state bar and the state attorney conduct apparatus 
than are their federal counterparts. This formal responsibility over the 
legal profession would suggest that state judges would exercise greater 
vigilance over the conduct of attorneys to whom the courts have given 
permission to practice. 155 
Our research, however, has not discerned any major differences, 
and, in fact, highlights parallel concerns among federal and state court 
judges. Despite some differences in particular views and actions, in 
153. This lack of a push by federal judges to create a comprehensive ethics code may explain 
why court opinions do not provide a clear or coherent vision of the source of power to regulate 
attorney conduct. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 2. 
154. See infra Part IV.B. 
155. In State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 566 (Vt. 2003), Justice Johnson, in his concurring 
opinion, expressed that, because of the state supreme court's ultimate responsibility under the state 
constitution to oversee the ethical conduct of attorneys and the court's role in promulgating the rules 
of ethics for attorneys, the court must be '''particularly vigilant' when reviewing cases where an 
attorney's conduct raises a substantial question about whether that conduct conforms to the rules of 
ethics we have promulgated to protect the public." 
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general the larger philosophical concerns regarding the judge's role in 
regulating attorney conduct appear to be very similar, namely ensuring 
fair, just and efficient proceedings and maintaining the integrity of the 
judicial system. State courts may be somewhat more likely to refer to 
upholding the honor of the legal profession. State court opinions 
reviewed include much of the same, broad philosophical language as the 
federal court opinions described in the previous section. Moreover, the 
nature and extent of sanction levied on an offending attorney often 
depends on the perceived impact of the behavior on the underlying 
proceedings and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. It is 
important to note, however, that regulation of attorney conduct is very 
case-specific and fact-intensive. As the discussion below suggests, state 
courts can vary considerably in their actions and views not only across 
jurisdictions but also, more surprisingly, even within a particular 
jurisdiction. 
B. The Power and Duty to Regulate in State Court Practice 
As in the federal court system, it is clear that state courts have the 
authority to supervise the conduct of lawyers who appear before them. In 
most states, if not all, the state's supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of 
attorney regulation and discipline. 156 The source of a state supreme 
court's authority is often the state constitution itself,157 or otherwise 
derived from case law. 158 
Although many opinions cite to the state supreme court's exclusive 
authority to discipline attorneys for misconduct, the power to regulate 
and oversee attorney conduct has been well-established to be within the 
auspices of any state court, including state trial courts that are entrusted 
with the duty to preserve an impartial forum, protect the litigation 
156. See Barton, supra note I, at 1185. 
157. See, e.g., Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357,1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) 
(finding that the state constitution gave the Florida Supreme Court the power to discipline 
attorneys); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 1987) (citing the state 
constitution as a source of authority to regulate attorney conduct); Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Johnson, 
J. concurring) (noting that the duty to oversee the ethics of attorneys admitted to practice arose from 
the Constitution). 
158. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33, 42 (S.D. 1989) (noting that "[tJhe 
ultimate decision for discipline of members of the State Bar rests with this court."); Clinard v. 
Blackwood, 46 S. W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 200 I) (stating that the court is responsible for enforcing and 
upholding the standards of professional responsibility); see also In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41,55 
(S.D. 2003) ("The final determination for the appropriate discipline of a member of the State Bar 
rests firmly with the wisdom of this Court."). 
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process and maintain courtroom order and decorum.159 As the Florida 
Supreme Court observed, "who better than judges, who have daily 
interaction with attorneys, to keep a proverbial finger on the pulse of 
attorney conduct?,,160 Court rules are occasionally referenced as the 
source of such authority.161 More often, however, opinions refer to long 
tradition and case law establishing an inherent power necessary for the 
proper and efficient administration of justice. 162 Some courts even cite 
federal court cases as support for the inherent authority possessed by all 
COurtS. 163 In addition, as noted in Part II, courts have referred to the 
159. See, e.g., Pantori, Inc., 384 So. 2d at 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that 
although the state supreme court has the exclusive power to discipline attorneys, the trial court has 
the authority to initiate appropriate disciplinary action and, to preserve an impartial forum, could 
constitutionally remove an attorney from a case given sufficient facts); Spivey v. Bender, 601 
N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("While the Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction 
over admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted, a trial court retains the 
'authority and duty to see to the ethical conduct of attorneys in proceedings before it."') (quoting 
Hahn v. Boeing Co., 621 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wash. 1980)). 
160. 5-H Corp. v. Padavano, 708 So. 2d 244,247 n.8 (Fla. 1997); see also Quinones v. State, 
766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
161. See, e.g., Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1994) (Without addressing the 
question as to whether the trial court had inherent authority to punish attorneys for "intolerable 
behavior that, unredressed, threatens the entire litigation process," the New York Court of Appeals 
pointed to the trial court's authority under the procedural rules of court, in that case the rule 
governing the subject of protective orders that "confers broad discretion upon a court to fashion 
appropriate remedies both where abuses are threatened ... and where they have already occurred. "); 
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d \068, 1080 (Utah 1997) 
(referencing to authority under Rule II of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
162. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (citing 
New England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1944), the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court acknowledged, "[t]here is no question that both the power to sanction and the power 
of contempt are derived from the same source, namely the inherent power of a court to do what is 
necessary to secure the administration of justice."); Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 
364,368 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (citing a case as far back as 1850, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
underscored the state's "long tradition of judicial oversight of the ethical conduct of its court 
officers"); Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 
(N.H. 1996) (citing case law, the court emphasized that the courts of New Hampshire are the 
"primary regulators of attorney conduct"); Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d. 356, 362 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing several cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed the trial 
court's "inherent authority to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the proper 
administration of justice," a power that "is essential to the court's existence and the orderly and 
efficient administration of justice" and includes the authority to address attorney conduct, which "is 
based upon the relationship of the attorney to the court and the authority which the court has over its 
own officers to prevent them from, or punish them for, committing acts of dishonesty or 
impropriety") (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 
at 382. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001). 
163. For example, in Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rested 
much of its authority not only on prior state cases but on the seminal Supreme Court case of 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). The North Carolina court placed much stock in the 
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state's code of judicial conduct as further, often additional, support for 
this authority.l64 
This power to regulate and oversee includes the power to 
sanction. 165 Efficiency and fairness is the dominant theme sounded by a 
large number of state court opinions. The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina's approach is illustrative: 
There is no question that a Superior Court, as part of its inherent 
powers to manage its affairs, to see that justice is done, and to see that 
the administration of justice is accomplished as expeditiously as 
possible, has the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate 
sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it. 166 
Practically speaking, "[t]he basic purpose of the trial court is to 
afford litigants an impartial forum in which their complaints and 
defenses may be presented, heard and decided with fairness.,,167 
The power to sanction, however, is not absolute, and appellate 
courts have reviewed sanctions (and in some instances overturned them) 
for abuse of discretion, 168 reasonableness,169 appropriateness of fit to the 
United States Supreme Court's reaffirmation that "all courts have inherent authority to punish 
lawyers for' ... disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience 
interfered with the conduct of trial.'" Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.s. at 44); 
see also Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist., 686 A.2d at 757-58 (citing, among others, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' hands-on approach and rejecting outright the Second Circuit's more 
restrained approach). 
164. See Evans & Luptak, PLC, 650 N.W.2d at 368 (noting that the long tradition of judicial 
oversight of attorney conduct "is consistent with the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 
3(B)(3)"); Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 510 N.E.2d at 383 ("Indeed we hasten to approve and encourage 
courts throughout this state in their efforts to halt unprofessional conduct and meet their 
responsibilities in reporting violations of the Code."); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 
P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); Granholm v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 625 N.W.2d 16,21 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2000); Spivey V. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) State V. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 
563 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring). 
165. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 5 (holding that trial courts can sanction attorneys 
for disobedience of court order or for conduct which disrespects the authority of the court or 
obstructs the underlying legal proceedings); Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1002-03 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2002) (affirming the trial judge's authority to hold in contempt or to sanction attorneys); R&R 
Energies, 936 P.2d at 1080-81 (finding that Rule I I gives trial court authority to impose sanctions 
against an attorney whose dilatory tactics through entire litigation were improper and oppressive). 
166. Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363. 
167. Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
168. See, e.g., State V. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992) (trial judge's action must be 
"within the realm of sound judicial discretion"); Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165,1171-72 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (taking all circumstances into consideration, trial court must exercise "sound 
discretion" and is to be given great deference); Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 362 (finding that the abuse of 
discretion standard is well-established); Spivey, 601 N.E.2d at 61 (finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion by sanctioning the attorney); R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1080-81 (appellate court will 
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alleged misconduct,t70 and/or lack of due process.171 As with federal 
courts, while the decision to sanction is given wide deference, the 
severity of the sanction often receives more rigorous review. The 
analysis is extremely fact-intensive and conducted on a case-by-case 
basis, but overall, appellate courts generally defer to the judgments of 
their trial court counterparts.172 Nevertheless, some jurisdictions grant 
more deference to trial courts than do others. 173 
Possessing the authority to regulate may be one thing; however, 
embracing the duty to regulate and exercising that authority may be yet 
another. Once again, reviewing court decisions may provide some 
insight into the attitudes and perceptions of judges with respect to the 
perceived duty to regulate. As one court stated, the inherent authority 
courts have "encompasses not only the 'power but also the duty to 
affirm trial court's sanctions against an attorney absent abuse of discretion); Gum v. Dudley, 505 
S.E.2d 391, 404 (W. Va. 1997) (holding sanctions for violations of general duty of candor are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion); see also Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 762-63 (W. Va. 
2003). 
169. See, e.g., Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363 (noting that a trial court has "authority to impose 
reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it" (emphasis added)). 
170. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 583 (noting that when imposing monetary 
sanctions, the trial court may impose sanctions in whatever amount it "considers reasonably related 
to any squandering of judicial resources or needless legal expenses incurred"); Byrnes v. Baca, 54 
P.3d 996, 1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that sanctions should fit the misconduct and 
whatever action the court takes should be supported by findings of fact); R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 
1080-81 (finding that the sanction imposed by the trial court fit the requirements of this particular 
case). 
171. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 582 (finding that the trial court must provide 
sufficient hearing on the matter for attorney to respond to the charges levied against her); Clark v. 
Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 154 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (court must provide an attorney with fair notice, 
the opportunity to be heard, and complete basis for particular sanction given); Byrnes, 54 P.3d at 
1005-06 (lack of sufficient notice given prior to suspending attorney). 
172. As one court suggested, the trial judge is in the best position to observe the jurors, 
witnesses and attorneys in order to assess attorney conduct and its impact. See Quinones, 766 So. 2d 
atll72n.9. 
173. See Quinones, 766 So. 2d at 1172 n.9, cf Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 367 (In a matter where an 
attorney lied to the court about her previous disciplinary history, revocation of the attorney's pro 
hac vice status in all North Carolina cases, suspension of that status for one year, and the court's 
decision to report attorney to state bars in other jurisdictions was upheld.); see also Quinones 766 
So. 2d at 1171-72 (court's order of mistrial affirmed where defense counsel's conduct undermined 
fairness of trial). Compare Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that where respondent's attorneys formerly represented the petitioner in a related 
subject matter, trial court could disqualifY the attorney from case), with Spivey; 601 N.E.2d at 58-59 
(although trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to disqualifY counsel, it must 
exercise that discretion wisely and only if attorney misconduct taints proceedings, even where 
attorneys' former representation of opposing party may result in appearance of impropriety), and 
Harris, 616 A.2d at 292-93 (trial court abused discretion when it dismissed indictment on the basis 
of prosecutor's failure to prosecute and comply with court's scheduling orders). 
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discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, for unprofessional 
conduct. ",174 Other courts sometimes refer to the duty as an ethical one 
under the appropriate canons. 175 Although most courts may agree that a 
duty does in fact exist to some degree, some courts appear to be more 
reluctant than others to assume an active duty.176 
The federal court debate discussed in Part lII.C on whether to take a 
hands-off or more active approach in regulating attorney conduct has 
percolated over to a few state courts. As we had theorized, two of the 
courts that have most directly addressed that debate have rejected the 
Second Circuit's more restrained approach that leaves the enforcement 
of ethics codes to the bar's existing disciplinary machinery, and instead 
favor the Fifth Circuit's more proactive stance. 177 In fact, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, in accepting the role as general overseer of 
lawyer ethics, stated in no uncertain terms: 
174. Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 233 (N.C. 1977)). 
175. See In re Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (finding that where the trial judge 
receives information indicating substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the 
code of professional responsibility, "simple communication with the lawyer satisfies the judge's 
ethical duty"); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003) (holding that the court has a 
duty under judicial canon 3D(2) to refer matters of attorney misconduct, here neglect of case, to the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel); cf In re Laprath, 670 N.w.2d 41, 63 (S.D. 2003) ("Among the 
administrative responsibilities imposed on a judge in Canon 3, therefore, is that of taking or 
initiating appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of 
which the judge may become aware. Thus, a judge exposes himself or herself to the disciplinary 
action for failure to report the misconduct of other judges or attorneys to attorney disciplinary 
bodies and judicial conduct commissions."). 
176. Compare R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring) ("The only 
way that the public's misperception of the vast majority of honest, conscientious, and ethical 
lawyers will ever be corrected is if individual judges and lawyers are willing to overcome a natural 
resistance to being perceived as troublemakers and vigorously fulfill their sworn duty to refer to 
disciplinary counsel lawyers who evidence patterns of improper and oppressive litigation tactics."), 
and Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 
1996) ("It would be inconsistent with this court's supervisory role to relegate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to the status of guidelines, to be enforced only when the trial process may be 
sullied."), with Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (court 
refuses to undertake a direct, independent policing role), State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 561-62 (Vt. 
2003) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the defendant's conviction 
where discovery violations by the prosecutor did not prejudice the defendant), and Spivey, 601 
N.E.2d at 58-59 ("[T]he law requires the [court's] discretion to be exercised wisely .... The issue 
arising from the application of [lawyers' ethical] ... standards cannot be resolved in a vacuum, and 
the ethical rules should not be blindly applied without consideration of relative hardships."); see 
also Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J. concurring) (recognizing that it is difficult for 
trial judges to make complaints against lawyers with whom they must work on a daily basis). 
177. See Sullivan County Reg 'I Refuse Disposal Dist., 686 A.2d at 757; Clinard v. Blackwood, 
46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001). 
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[The Second Circuit's] approach has been rejected by a majority of the 
courts that have considered the issue, and we reject it today .... The 
courts of this State are the primary regulators of attorney conduct. ... 
It would be inconsistent with this court's supervisory role to relegate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct to the status of Fidelines, to be 
enforced only when the trial process may be sullied. 17 
1461 
Such language reinforces the expectation that state courts would 
tend to be more vigilant and active regulators than their federal 
counterparts. As with the federal courts, the practice does not seem to 
follow the rhetoric. Despite its claim that the majority of courts have 
rejected the more restrained approach, the New Hampshire court cites 
but a few supporting cases and, more importantly, only one state case. 
Moreover, the language in the opinions of other state cases indicate a 
less-than-enthusiastic attitude towards judicial regulation of attorney 
conduct, especially if it requires vacating or reversing verdicts upon a 
determination that the attorney for the prevailing party had violated rules 
of professional responsibility!79 Overall, taking a broader view of all the 
cases leads to the conclusion that state courts,. like their federal 
counterparts, generally take a more hybrid approach towards regulating 
attorney conduct, primarily addressing egregious conduct that threatens 
the entire litigation process and undermines the judicial system. 
How appellate courts treat a trial court's failure to act upon 
allegations of serious misconduct also provides some insight into how 
judges in a particular jurisdiction view judicial regulation of attorney 
conduct. For example, appellate courts on occasion have used strong 
language to admonish a trial court judge for not taking action when 
confronted with egregious misbehavior. 18o In other cases, despite serious 
178. Sullivan County Reg 'I Refuse Disposal Dist., 686 A.2d at 757 (citations omitted). 
179. See, e.g., Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1037 (finding that where underlying proceedings were not 
tainted by misconduct, taking an active, "policing role would go well beyond the requirements of 
Canon 3D(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct ... and create a demand for significant increases in 
judicial resources"). 
180. See, e.g., Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hospital-Troy, 602 N.W.2d 854, 861-62 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) ("Unfortunately, the record makes it abundantly clear that although the trial 
court recognized the impropriety of the conduct of plaintiff's lead trial counsel, the court was either 
unwilling or unable to control counsel's conduct. ... Particularly disturbing to this Court is that in 
response to defendants' post judgment motion for a new trial based on the misconduct of plaintiff's 
lead trial counsel, the trial court acknowledged that it 'had great problems with the conduct of 
counsel during the trial' and could not 'condone many things that happened during this trial,' ... but 
the trial court then declined to even rule on the claim of misconduct. ... The trial court has a duty to 
assure that the parties before it receive a fair trial. The court in this case did not fulfill this duty and 
left it to this Court to grant defendants the relief to which they are entitled. "(citations omitted)); see 
also State v. Rivera, 514 S.E.2d 720, 723 (N.c. 1999) (regarding disparaging comments made by 
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allegations of attorney misconduct, appellate courts have concluded that 
the trial court's inaction and failure to report the matter to the 
appropriate state bar was not subject to appellate review. 181 As with 
federal circuit courts, state appellate courts have felt obligated to take 
action, for example by initiating a referral to the state bar disciplinary 
authority,182 remanding the matter to the trial court to determine the 
appropriate sanction,183 or even setting aside a large jury verdict,184 
Indeed, at least one appellate judge has suggested that it may be more 
appropriate, or at least easier, for an appellate court than a trial court to 
refer an attorney to the appropriate authorities. 185 
C. Rationale for State Court Actions Regulating Attorney Conduct 
Many of the rationales espoused by state courts when regulating 
attorney conduct are the same as those emphasized by their federal court 
counterparts. Often, state courts provide multiple reasons to support their 
decision to sanction or report an attorney. First and foremost, courts are 
primarily concerned with providing a fair, efficient, and impartial forum 
for disputes. Courts abhor conduct that interferes with and taints the 
prosecutor against opposing counsel, state supreme court concluded that "the trial court's comments 
were not enough" and admonished trial courts to take seriously their duty to make sure that the 
mandates of the rules are strictly complied with in all cases and to impose appropriate sanctions if 
they are not); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 403 (W. Va. 1997) (In addressing the trial court's 
failure to consider an attorney's general duty of candor, the court states, "[w]henever a duty is 
imposed it must be accompanied by an appropriate remedy or sanction for a violation of the duty. 
Not to provide a remedy or sanction renders the duty meaningless."). 
181. See, e.g., Theriault v. 1.S. & G. Asphalt, Inc., 617 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) ("[W]e do not believe the trial court's failure to report this matter to the Florida Bar is subject 
to appellate review. "). 
182. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); AIG Haw. Ins. 
Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 
936 P.2d 1068, 1081-82 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.l. concurring); Wade, 839 A.2d. at 562-66 
(Johnson, J. concurring); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum, 505 S.E.2d 
at 405. 
183. See Gum, 505 S.E.2d at 405 (remanding the matter of an attorney's conduct to the trial 
court for appropriate consideration after finding that the trial court failed to address the issue of the 
attorney's general duty of candor to the court regarding a settlement agreement). 
184. See Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d at 856 ($15 million verdict set aside). 
185. See Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("Indeed, we recognize that it is 
difficult for trial judges to make complaints to the Professional Responsibility Program against 
lawyers with whom they have to work on a day to day basis. That neither defense counsel nor the 
trial judge here chose to make the referral does not mean that this Court should also decline to do 
so. We are more removed from the working relationship between district court judges and the 
attorneys practicing before them. I am, therefore, referring this matter to the Professional 
Responsibility Program for further investigation and appropriate action. "). 
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underlying proceedings.186 Related to that concern, they want to 
maintain civility, courtroom order and decorum, and protect the interests 
of all litigants. 187 Towards those ends, courts will sanction or report 
attorneys for, among other things, ignoring the court's evidentiary 
rulings, making improper and highly prejudicial remarks during trial, 
behaving uncivilly, engaging in conduct intended to divert the jurors' 
attention from the merits of the case, and abusing the discovery process 
in a way that threatens the fairness of the entire litigation process. 
Like the federal courts, state courts are also very concerned with 
conduct that undermines or erodes the integrity of the judicial system 
and the public's confidence in the legal system,188 wastes judicial 
resources,189 and dishonors the legal profession or otherwise adversely 
impacts the public's perception of the bar,190 which are all very often 
186. See, e.g., Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., 778 So. 2d 443, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); 
Quinones, 766 So. 2d at 1171-72; Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d at 861-62; Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E.2d 
1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1994); Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.w.3d 177, 187-88 (Tenn. 2001); Wasielewski 
v. K Mart Corp., 891 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Lemons v. Commonwealth, 420 
S.E.2d 525, 528 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (Benton, J., dissenting); see also Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 
2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (sanctions vacated where there was no evidence that 
misconduct tainted proceedings); Bell v. Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) 
(reversing the trial court's sanctions after finding that "there was no nexus between the misconduct" 
and the tainted proceedings); infra note 207. 
187. See, e.g., 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244,246-47 (Fla. 1997); Byrnes v. Baca, 54 
P.3d 996,1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Covington, 582 S.E.2d at 762. 
188. See Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) ("Confidence in our 
legal system is undermined when attorneys are allowed to assail a judge personally rather than 
addressing the legal issues at hand."); see, e.g., Quinones, 766 So. 2d 1165 at 1167 (sanctioning the 
attorney for disregarding court orders and rulings; making improper and prejudicial comments 
during proceedings; making derogatory and disparaging comments about judge and opposing 
counsel and witnesses; failing to disclose evidence pursuant to discovery rules); Aveline-Wright v. 
Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that the attorney was "making a 
mockery" of the legal proceeding by directing client not to cooperate with GAL; challenging 
integrity of judges and appointed experts; exhibiting a lack of professionalism in advocacy; filing 
''vexatious and harassing motions"); see also In re Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33, 42 (S.D. 
1989); Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 182,187. 
189. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 582 (noting that any monetary award given in a 
case should correspond to the resources wasted as a result of the misconduct); Clark v. Clark, 716 
N.E.2d 144, 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (impeding the efficient administration of justice by walking 
out of court on final day of trial); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Haw. 
1996) (failing to disclose to the court the material fact of settlement wastes time and limited 
resources of court and denies availability of courts to deserving litigants); R&R Energies v. Mother 
Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (engaging in "dilatory tactics" and filing 
pleadings that were not relevant or productive, with the sole purpose of harassing or causing 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in cost of litigation). 
190. See 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246-47 (finding lack of professionalism, including making 
unfounded accusations of bias against judges and inappropriately attacking opposing counsel's 
arguments using expletives); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1043-44 
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inexorably linked to unprofessional conduct that threatens the fairness of 
the underlying proceeding. Occasionally, although less predominantly, 
state courts also refer to their role as overseer oflawyer ethics. 191 
Although the importance of controlling the proceedings before 
them and maintaining the integrity and efficiency of the legal system 
appear to provide the primary justifications for responding to attorney 
misconduct, state courts appear to cite to the Code of Judicial Conduct 
and compliance with the judicial canons more often than the federal 
courts do, and usually as a means to provide additional support to justify 
their action. Rarely is it the only justification for addressing misconduct. 
As discussed in Part II, whether the judicial code represents an ethical 
dUtyl92 to address attorney misconduct or merely encourages action as 
(Md. 2000) (inter alia, unlawfully representing a client while decertified; failing to appear in court; 
failing to produce records; commingling client funds); In re Lapreth, 670 N.W.2d 41, 64 (S.D. 
2003) (providing incompetent legal services); In re Stanton, 446 N.W.2d at 36 (noting eight cases of 
misconduct, including, among others, ignorance of the law, lying to the court, and betraying client 
confidences); Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 187; R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081. In State v. Rivera, 514 
S.E.2d 720, 723 (N.C. 1999), the Court lamented that, 
We have viewed with concern the apparent decline in civility in our trial courts. This 
Court shall not tolerate, and our trial courts must not tolerate, comments in court by one 
lawyer tending to disparage the personality or performance of another. Such comments 
tend to reduce public trust and confidence in our courts and, in more extreme cases, 
directly interfere with the truth-finding function by distracting judges and juries from the 
serious business at hand. We admonish our trial courts to take seriously their duty to 
insure that the mandates of Rule 12 [of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior 
and District Courts) are strictly complied with in all cases and to impose appropriate 
sanctions if they are not. 
191. See, e.g., Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364,369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); 
Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1996); 
State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565-66 (VI. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring). 
192. See, e.g., Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that 
Canon D of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to take a appropriate action when aware 
of attorney misconduct); Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d 356, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001) (stating that Canon 3(B)(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct imposes a duty on 
the court to discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct); In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41,63-64 
(S.D. 2003) (noting that Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that judges take or 
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003) 
(finding that it was the court's obligation to refer the attorney misconduct to the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395,402 (Haw. 1996) 
(explaining that Hawaii's Supreme Court was "compelled to refer the record of this case to the 
[Office of Disciplinary Counsel) for its review and appropriate action" as a result of attorney's 
probable violation of rules of professional conduct); Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 841 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the court is bound by Canon 3D(2) to inform state bar of attorney 
misconduct); Gonzalez v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471,473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the Code of 
Judicial Conduct requires judge to initiate disciplinary action in the case of prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
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good judicial practice193 remains a question. Citation to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct as a justification for action is sometimes 
noncommittal. 194 Nevertheless, state courts occasionally do cite to 
Canon 3, particularly to support a referral to the state bar disciplinary 
apparatus. 195 
D. Imposing Sanctions to Address Attorney Misconduct 
The sanctions imposed by state courts on attorneys range widely 
and, as in the federal courts, may include fines, assessment of fees and 
costs, disqualification, referral to state bar, and public reprimand. l96 
Often, more than one of these sanctions will apply.197 As with federal 
193. See, e.g., Bell v. Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that under 
Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct a judge observes attorney misconduct he may pursue 
disciplinary action); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 1987) (encouraging 
courts to stop unprofessional conduct by reporting violations as indicated under Canon 3B(3) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct); see also State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, at 565-66 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J. 
concurrence). 
194. See, e.g., 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246-47 (Citing Canon 30(2) as additional support for 
the decision to report an attorney to the state bar, the court refers to reporting to the Florida Bar any 
professional misconduct of a fellow attorney as an obligation; however, the court later goes on to 
actively encourage such reporting.); see also R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081-82 (Zimmerman, 
C.J., concurring). 
195. Note that all the matters in footnotes 191-93 supra, are cases in which the courts 
discussed referring attorney misconduct to the appropriate state bar disciplinary authorities. In fact, 
in one case, in addition to levying sanctions against the attorney within the state of North Carolina, 
the court reported the attorney to the bars of two other states where she practiced. See Couch, 544 
S.E.2d at 367. For further discussion regarding judicial ethical obligations, refer to text 
accompanying footnotes 36-37, supra Part II.C. on "Judicial Ethics Obligation to Report to the 
Bar." 
196. See, e.g., Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 359-60 (Depending on the circumstances, "[s]anctions 
available include citations for contempt, censure, informing the North Carolina State Bar of the 
misconduct, imposition of costs, suspension for a limited time of the right to practice before the 
court, suspension for a limited time of the right to practice law in the State, and disbarment.") 
(citing In re Robinson, 247 S.E.2d 241, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 
404 (W. Va. 1997) (Sanctions for violating general duty of candor include but are not limited to: 
"(I) ordering disclosure of information not disclosed, (2) granting a continuance, (3) holding 
counsel in contempt, (4) precluding a party from calling a witness, offering evidence, or raising a 
defense, (5) dismissal of a case, (6) declaring a mistrial, (7) imposing attorney's fees and litigation 
costs, or (8) granting a new triaL"). 
197. See Couch, 544 S.E.2d at 360 (Because attorney in initial proceedings improperly 
characterized veracity of opposing counsel and defense witnesses during closing argument and then 
during hearings on sanctions for misconduct lied to court and failed to disclose previous disciplinary 
action, sanctions included, among other things, revocation of current pro hac vice status in North 
Carolina, suspension of practicing in the state for one year, attendance at continuing legal education 
classes, attachment of copy of court's order to any motion to appear pro hac vice in North Carolina 
for the next five years, referrals by copy of court's order to New York and Florida bars where she is 
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judges, state court judges also have a wide range of informal sanctions at 
their disposal. For example, they may use their considerable drafting 
powers to publicize the misconduct and send a messagel98 or, more 
minimally, rely simply on communicating their concerns informally with 
the lawyer. 199 
As in the federal courts, particular sanctions given in state courts 
are likely due to a number of factors, including the specific 
circumstances of each case, the type of misconduct being addressed, the 
judge's own views on whether and how to address attorney behavior, the 
history of the litigation and the particular stage in which the alleged 
misconduct occurred, and the reputation of the attorney.200 
Courts apply sanctions with a variety of purposes in mind. For 
example, in some instances, sanctions may be designed simply to 
punish, while in others they are also used "to compensate the aggrieved 
litigant for the actual loss incurred by the misconduct of the offending 
party.,,201 Courts may use sanctions as a means of deterrence202 or to 
protect the public from incompetent and unprofessional attorneys.203 
Regardless of how active a court wants to be in regulating attorney 
misconduct, courts generally appear to perceive that the most 
appropriate remedy is one that focuses on the culpable attorney and not 
licensed to practice, imposition of reasonable attorney fees, censure, and requirement that she report 
the court's order of sanctions as an order of discipline when required to do so.). 
198. See id. at 671 (publicizing misconduct can have a serious, intended effect on an attorney's 
reputation); see a/so Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (Md. 2000) 
(sanctions may be used to "demonstrate[ ] to members of the legal profession the type of conduct 
that will not be tolerated. "); S-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246 n.7 ("It is our hope that by publishing this 
opinion and thereby making public the offending and demeaning exchanges between these 
particular attorneys, that the entire bar will benefit.") (quoting Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 699 So. 2d 
1357,1360 (Fla. 1997». 
199. See, e.g., In re Eicher, 661 N.W. 2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (noting that in circumstances 
where the second clause of Canon 30(2) is not invoked to require reporting, "[s]imple 
communication with the lawyer satisfies the judge's ethical duty" to take appropriate action). 
200. See. e.g.. Gum, 505 S.E.2d at 404 ("Our review of the cases involving sanctions for 
violating the general duty of candor, illustrate to us that there is no one sanction that fits all 
situations. The facts of each case must be considered to establish an appropriate sanction. We 
recognize that a violation ... may occur at any stage of the litigation process. As a result, the 
particular litigation stage at which the violation occurred will playa strong role in determining an 
appropriate sanction."). 
201. Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
202. See. e.g., Briscoe, 745 A.2d at 1044 (By imposing the ultimate sanction of disbarment, 
"the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are 
imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules."). 
203. See. e.g., In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41,66 (S.D. 2003). 
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on the parties to the underlying litigation.204 They believe that the 
litigants should neither unduly benefit from205 nor have to pay for an 
attorney's misbehavior.206 This is particularly true where the misconduct 
has no adverse impact on the underlying proceedings.207 Where the 
offensive conduct in fact tainted the litigation and undennined the 
fairness of the trial, however, courts are willing to levy sanctions that go 
beyond disciplining the attorney and impact the outcome of the case, 
including vacating a verdict or even dismissing a criminal conviction?08 
204. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291-92 (Del. 1992) (citing direction from U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent, the Delaware Supreme Court found dismissal of criminal action an 
inappropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct in the absence of any prejudice to the defendant; 
instead, courts should "impose a sanction, such as reprimand, disciplinary referral, or contempt, 
which focuses on the culpable individual."); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 1986) 
(finding that disciplinary sanction against prosecutor rather than suppression of defendant's 
voluntary statement was appropriate remedy for prosecutor's unethical conduct). 
205. See, e.g., Harris, 616 A.2d at 291-92 (finding that the sanction given should target the 
offending attorney, in that case a prosecutor, "rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced 
defendant" (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,263 (1988»). 
206. See, e.g., Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding 
that where the process was not tainted by improper prejudicial remarks of plaintiff's attorney, the 
court is unwilling to punish litigants for the unethical comments of their lawyers; instead, the more 
appropriate remedy should be referral of the attorney to the Bar); Clark v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 
152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (reminding trial judges that they should "avoid punishing a litigant for 
his attorney's errors, when less drastic measures are available"); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 
756, 773-74 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, C.J., concurring) (encouraging courts to hesitate to punish 
innocent litigants for the "positive misconduct" of their attorneys). 
207. See Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1036; Covington, 582 S.E.2d at 773-74; see also Bell v. 
Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 351-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing trial court's vacating arbitral 
award as a means to sanction the attorney who initially served as the mediator for both parties and 
then acted as one of the party's counsel during arbitration after mediation failed, appellate court 
underscored the lack of taint on proceedings); Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1991) (In an apparent conflict of interest case, despite court's broad discretion in determining 
whether to disqualify counsel, "[d]isqualification ... 'should ordinarily be granted only when a 
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility poses a significant risk of trial 
taint."'(quoting Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. 653 F.2d 756, 748 (I981»); State v. Wade, 839 
A.2d 559, 559 (Vt. 2003) (fmding that the trial court's dismissal of a conviction as a means to 
sanction the state's attorney's office for an ongoing pattern of discovery abuse, was an abuse of 
discretion because the misconduct did not prejudice defendant). This seems to be especially true in 
criminal matters in which society, and in particular communities, have an important stake and 
whose safety and interests in ensuring that the guilty are punished should not be jeopardized 
because of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Harris, 616 A.2d at 292 (noting that the trial judge is 
responsible for safeguarding the public interest in the administration of criminal justice); Gonzalez 
v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing the public's concern that the guilty 
are punished). 
208. See, e.g., Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1167, 1171-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(granting of prosecutor's motion for mistrial upheld where defense counsel's "unethical" and 
"contumacious" conduct undermined the fairness of the trial making it impossible for either the 
state or the defendant to receive a fair trial); Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hospital-Troy, 602 
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These broader sanctions demonstrate that, as in the federal realm, state 
courts are very concerned with running an efficient, fair, and impartial 
courtroom and avoiding any taint on the proceedings that renders the 
outcome suspect and unreliable. 
Because of the varied and fact-intensive nature of these types of 
cases, it is very difficult to discern trends among state courts associating 
sanctions with particular types of conduct. It is clear, however, that when 
the court feels that an attorney is purposely squandering judicial 
resources, disrespecting the dignity of the court and proceedings, or 
employing tactics designed to delay the proceedings and compel the 
opposing party to incur needless expense, sanctions will likely include 
fines or attorneys' fees. 209 
In addition, as discussed above, where the misconduct taints the 
underlying proceedings, particularly in situations where an attorney 
prejudices a jury against one of the parties by, for example, introducing 
evidence in violation of court orders, making disparaging comments 
about the opposing side or their arguments or failing to disclose 
requested material information, courts generally will not hesitate to 
render sanctions that impact the course of the underlying proceedings.210 
These types of sanctions may include vacating criminal convictions, 
granting motions for mistrial, or setting aside jury verdicts. 
N.W.2d 854, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that it was appropriate to set aside a verdict of$15 
million where plaintiffs counsel's misconduct denied defendant fair trial); Wasielewski v. K Mart 
Corp., 891 S.w.2d 916, 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (setting aside a verdict of $1.5 million where 
attorney's conduct of raising evidence in contradiction to judge's rulings in motions in limine 
unfairly prejudiced jury against the defendant); Lemons v. Commonwealth, 420 S.E.2d 525, 526 
(Va. Ct. App. 1992) (vacating and remanding a murder conviction as a result of prosecutor's failure 
to disclose important information as required). 
209. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 580-81 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) 
(finding that reasonable attorney fees may be imposed, after sufficient due process, against attorney 
who directed her client not cooperate with GAL, challenged the integrity of the judge and appointed 
court experts, filed 88 frivolous motions with intent of harass opposing party); Clark, 716 N.E.2d at 
150-51 (stating that reasonable attorney fees may be imposed where attorney made disparaging 
remarks towards opposing counsel and court and left trial on final day without permission); R&R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080-81 (Utah 1997) (finding that $3500 
in attorney fees was a reasonable sanction where attorney filed numerous pleadings with sole 
purpose of harassing or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in litigation costs); see also 
Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1009 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding trial judge's sanction of $\000 
fine against attorney where attorney disobeyed direct orders from the judge, incessantly disrupted 
proceedings, badgered opposing counsel and witnesses, and insulted judge's case management 
practices). 
210. See related text and accompanying note 209. 
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Suspension211 and disbarment212 through the state disciplinary apparatus 
are reserved, generally, for the most egregious conduct, where the 
attorney demonstrates ignorance of the law or lacks professional 
competence. 
State courts appear more inclined than their federal counterparts to 
refer misconduct to the state bar when an attorney's conduct appears to 
violate the rules of professional responsibility and places suspicion on an 
attorney's ability to practice law ethically. Although acknowledged as a 
practice judges resist,213 state judges do occasionally refer attorney 
misconduct to the state bar. Trial judges may report misconduct by, for 
example, requesting a court clerk or opposing counsel to deliver a copy 
of the court's order or opinion to the state bar,z14 Appellate court judges 
may utilize their considerable drafting powers to articulate in very strong 
language why they believe the conduct was wrongful as part of the 
referral.215 This allows the court to establish norms of conduct but leave 
the specifics of the sanction to the formal disciplinary apparatus. 
211. See, e.g., Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 544 S.E.2d 356, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that in light of other possible sanctions available, the level of the attorney's misconduct 
required suspension); see also Fla. Bar v. Kravitz, 694 So. 2d 725, 726, 728-29 (Fla. 1997) (30-day 
suspension and requirement to attend continuing legal education courses for attorney who presented 
false evidence to court). 
212. See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1039, 1041, 1043, 1045 
(Md. 2000) (holding disbarment warranted where attorney represented client in criminal matter 
while decertified, commingled client funds, and failed to produce requested records); In re Laprath, 
670 N.W.2d 41, 54-55, 66 (S.D. 2003) (finding disbarment warranted where attorney lacks 
professional competency, is ignorant oflaw and professional rules, and is unable to comprehend the 
rules regarding when she is entitled to other people's money for fees); In re Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 
33, 36-43 (S.D. 1989) (stating that disbarment is warranted where attorney demonstrates ignorance 
oflaw, employs unconscionable delay tactics, lies to court, and betrays client confidences). 
213. See R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring) 
(characterizing reluctance as "natural resistance to being perceived as troublemakers"); State v. 
Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565 (VI. 2003) (Johnson, J. concurring) (noting reluctance on the part of 
judges to report lawyers with whom they must work on a daily basis); see also Fravel v. Haughey, 
727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Disl. CI. App. 1999) (finding it "troubling that trial judges are reluctant 
to curb the abuse perpetrated by trial counsel in the area of improper comments made during closing 
arguments"). 
214. See, e.g., Kravitz, 694 So. 2d at 726 (noting that the trial judge instructed opposing 
counsel to deliver copy of contempt order to state bar); Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 360 (noting that the 
judge reported pro hac vice attorney to both state bars in which she was licensed to practice). 
215. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.8 (Fla. Disl. CI. App. 2000); R&R 
Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring); Wade, 839 A.2d at 565-66 (Johnson, 1., 
concurring); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d. 
391,405 (W. Va. 1997); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); 
People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 1979) (William, J., concurring and dissenting); State 
v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (VI. 1980), overruled by Jones v. Shea, 532 A.2d 571 (VI. 1987). 
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As discussed above, sanctions are subject to appellate review, 
usually pursuant to a relatively deferential standard such as "abuse of 
discretion.,,216 As noted above, while the decision to sanction is often 
upheld, the nature of the sanction appears to undergo more scrutiny. 
Courts must provide sufficient due process in determining the 
appropriate sanction, requiring at a minimum, fair notice, sufficient 
opportunity to be heard, and basis for the particular sanction levied.217 
Moreover, very importantly, the particular sanction imposed must be 
narrowly tailored to the specific misconduct at issue.218 For example, 
although it is generally accepted that courts can assess a portion of 
attorneys' fees as a sanction for misbehavior, the amount should be 
tailored to the judicial resources wasted or unnecessarily expended as a 
result of the misconduct.219 This is true for other types of sanctions as 
wel1.22o 
Occasionally we came across cases illustrating the courts' 
reluctance to impose traditional sanctions on an attorney for 
misconduct.221 Despite strong dicta by which these courts criticize an 
attorney's conduct, some cases fail to award sanctions even when 
actions of the attorney are clearly unethicae22 and unprofessional.223 A 
216. See supra text accompanying note 168. 
217. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
218. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
219. Compare Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) 
(remanding to trial court to determine reasonableness of $7,500 sanction where attorney, among 
other things, filed 88 frivolous motions), and Clark v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1999) (holding $14,000 excessive in light of attorney conduct, which consisted of disrespectful 
behavior and disparaging remarks during course of trial and leaving the courtroom without 
pennission on the final day of trial), with R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1073, 1081 (finding sanction 
of $3,500 in attorney fees reasonable where attorney disobeyed court discovery orders, filed 
numerous pleadings and motions regarding matters previously settled by the court and filed other 
motions simply to harass or cause unnecessary delays). 
220. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (affinning 
contempt order and $1,000 fine against attorney who repeatedly ignored the court's warnings and 
disobeyed direct orders of the judge by disrupting and interrupting hearing, but reversed trial court's 
pennanent suspension of attorney, finding that such a harsh sanction did not fit the particular facts 
of that case and leaving open altogether the question as to whether a trial court can even suspend an 
attorney indefinitely). 
221. The extent of reluctance is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, because courts 
reluctant to address misconduct and impose sanctions most likely do not inclUde such discussions in 
their opinions or orders. The only time such reluctance is addressed fonnally is when a court 
otherwise would sanction an attorney but for the particular circumstances of the case requiring them 
to refrain from acting. 
222. See Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
223. See Neshat v. County of San Bernardino, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10646, at **26-
27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
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court may decide not to award traditional sanctions against an attorney 
because of the lack of precedent or guidance regarding the conducr24 or 
because an attorney raises his or her First Amendment free speech 
rights225 or where the requested remedy would punish litigants for the 
unethical conduct of their lawyers, particularly in cases where the 
attorney's misconduct did not taint the proceedings.226 
Reviewing opinions from various jurisdictions provides us with 
some insight into judicial attitudes about and frustrations with attorney 
misconduct and a court's responsibility as either a guardian of the 
system or a regulator of attorney behavior. As with the federal courts, 
state courts do not spend much time or rhetoric on explaining the basis 
of their power; they simply assert it. 
V. CRITIQUE & CONCLUSION: WHAT WE DON'T KNow 
Judges control their courtrooms with an understanding that they 
have not just the power but some responsibility to regulate the conduct 
of attorneys that adversely affects the integrity of the judicial 
proceeding. This role corresponds to the court's institutional 
competence. Who better than the judge, who has often seen the conduct 
or the consequences of it, to address the underlying ethical issues to the 
extent that they have an impact on the administration of justice?227 The 
judicial emphasis in both federal and state courts on efficiency, fairness 
and assuring the integrity of the proceeding before the court emphasized 
this unique judicial competence. Courts appear interested in and willing 
to regulate attorney conduct primarily where the conduct is strongly 
224. See Evaf/S, 650 N.W.2d at 373 (finding that although referral fee agreement by which 
plaintiff-attorney would receive one-third of attorney fees realized in wrongful death action against 
his own client was clearly unethical and in violation of rules of professional conduct, trial court did 
not err in failing to award sanctions where no published opinion had ever ruled on the enforceability 
of such agreements). 
225. Compare Neshat, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10646, at **22-26 (public defender who 
made inappropriate and disparaging sexual remarks against prosecutor protected by First 
Amendment) with Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2647, at 
*21 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) ("[T]he significant state interest in preserving public confidence in the 
judicial system outweighs the free speech rights of Notopoulos to make reckless accusations about 
the integrity of a probate judge. "). 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08. 
227. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1361 (lst Cir. 1995) (the district 
court judges "are in a position to observe the subpoena practices of attorneys appearing before 
them"). 
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relevant to the court's core function of adjudicating decisions.228 Both 
federal and state courts may have broader power to regulate attorneys, 
but they do not appear eager to embrace that power. 
Inevitably courts also consider the relative institutional competence 
of the other enforcement systems.229 Formal disciplinary systems, such 
as the state disciplinary body and federal court committees, have the 
ability to provide the requisite due process and fact finding that might 
otherwise consume significant judicial resources. They have 
investigators to assist in fact finding. These formal systems can detect 
patterns that may not be discernible to an individual judge. 
In this article we have explored written opinions, the traditional 
body of data available to those who study the legal profession, searching 
out topics such as conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and contact with 
represented persons and litigation misbehavior that goes beyond mere 
accidental violation of rules of procedure.230 From reading hundreds of 
cases on legal ethics, it is manifestly evident that a great many issues are 
not reflected in the published decisions. Only a small fraction of cases 
filed in federal and state court will ever result in a court decision, and 
even fewer of those result in written opinions that are reported and 
available for distribution.231 Even with reported decisions, judges have a 
228. The advocate witness rule, which generally prohibits a lawyer from serving as both 
advocate and witness, presents an interesting example of the intersection of fairness, efficiency and 
legal ethics. Most courts that have addressed the issue conclude that the legal ethics rules do not 
render the evidence inadmissible. When confronted with an advocate whose testimony is needed, 
the court typically puts the truth-seeking function of admitting the evidence as the paramount 
concern and uses procedural devices, including voluntary withdrawal or disqualification, to address 
the resulting ethical issue. See Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379,380-82 (Ohio 1987). 
See generally Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate As Witness: Understanding Culture, Context and 
Client, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 945 (2001). 
229. Cf Bergeron ex rei Perez v. O'Neil, 74 P.3d 952, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("Although 
respondents may not view the avowal requirement coupled with the State Bar enforcement 
mechanism as a perfect or adequate remedy for alleged violations of Rule I 0.2(b), it is the remedy 
our supreme court has chosen. Nothing in this record suggests that mechanism is ineffective, 
unworkable, or somehow 'insulates the rule's continued misuse' .... "); see also Zacharias & 
Green, supra note 2, at 1374 ("federal judges exercising broad regulatory authority would be 
assuming functions which they have neither the expertise, information, nor the resources to fulfill"). 
230. See generally McMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8; Green, Conflicts of Interest in 
Litigation, supra note 2. 
231. See generally Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The 
Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & SOC'y REv. 869 (1999). See also Samuel R. Gross & 
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. 
REv. 1,7 (1996); John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil Procedure and the 
Missing Uniform Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 865, 871 (1996). This phenomenon 
results in a significant selection bias "because published opinions are not a representative sampling 
of all cases." Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note II, at 259. 
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great deal of discretion in deciding what to include in a written opinion. 
Because reported decisions generally focus on formal rule-based 
violations, ethical issues that are resolved through informal means or 
that are not addressed by clear rule violations are often not addressed. 
We need a more systematic understanding of the range of judicial 
attitudes exhibited by judges in their courtrooms-the behavior that 
judges observe, and what action they take in response to those behaviors. 
We need a better understanding of why judges impose varying sanctions 
for similar behavior.232 From this understanding of what judges do, we 
can develop a better understanding of how judges view the relationship 
between the law of lawyering and judicial ethics and the variables that 
appear to shape a judge's attitude (such as practice background, 
experience and philosophy of judging). This, in tum, can yield insights 
into judicial ethics, including the judge's ethical obligation to report 
misconduct, judicial temperament, civility, and best practices in 
rectifying imbalance in the quality of advocacy and pro se 
representation. 
We can gain significant benefits from looking more carefully at the 
practices of judges. With a better understanding of judicial approaches to 
legal ethics, we can develop more effective collaborations with judges to 
reduce the incidents of unethical behavior by lawyers. Law professors 
who teach legal ethics would gain hard data on the ethical issues that 
arise in litigation, not merely the arguably distorted picture that arises 
from reported decisions.233 If we can teach our students just a little 
better, and if judges can guide lawyers just a little more, and if the bar 
and judges can work out a thoughtful allocation of responsibility, we 
might collectively improve litigation practice. We need more knowledge 
to achieve that goal. 
232. See, e.g., McMoRROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8, at §811.02[8] (varying sanctions 
for failure to cite directly contrary authority). See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes 
and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. V.L. REv. 
I (1998); John D. Fabian and Brian Reinthaler, Comment, An Examination of the Uniformity (or 
Lack Thereof) of Attorney Sanctions, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059 (2001). 
233. A comparison of federal and state judges could also provide sociologists of the legal 
profession with a stronger understanding of the varying experiences of federal and state courts, 
including insights into the existence of sub-communities oflawyers. 
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